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We propose a new, widely applicable model for analyzing
knowledge-based (epistemic) and strategic properties of cryptographic
protocols. The main result we prove is that the corresponding model
checking problem with respect to an expressive epistemic extension of
ATL∗ is decidable. As an application, we prove that abuse-freeness
of contract signing protocols is decidable, resolving an open question.
Further, we discuss anonymous broadcast and a coin-flipping protocol.
Introduction
In design and verification of cryptographic protocols, symbolic tech-
niques [DY83] have proven very successful. A breakthrough result in this
area is that secrecy properties of protocols can be decided in NP, even if the
adversary is allowed to send arbitrarily complex terms [RT03]. Such tech-
niques have led to algorithmic protocol verification [MS01] and were used to
uncover problems in well-known protocols [Low96].
Recently, game-based properties of cryptographic protocols have been
studied [KR02]. Such properties are relevant e.g., for contract sign-
ing [BOGMR90, ASW98, GJM99] and non-repudiation [KR03] proto-
cols, and can naturally be expressed in Alternating-Time Temporal Logic
(ATL, [AHK02]), a logic explicitly designed to reason about strategies. De-
cidability results for such properties have been obtained in [KKT07, KKW09]
However, existing symbolic models for strategic analysis have the follow-
ing limitations:
(i) They are not able to express epistemic properties of protocols. Such
properties are concerned with knowledge of principals in the protocol.
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Examples are abuse-freeness of contract-signing [KKW06] or anony-
mous broadcast.
(ii) They only consider complete-information strategies : Both honest prin-
cipals and the adversary may base their strategic decisions on com-
plete knowledge about the current state, including messages exchanged
between other principals and secrets hidden by cryptographic means.
Thus, capabilities of all parties are over-approximated, potentially lead-
ing to both “false positives” and “false negatives” in the security anal-
ysis.
(iii) They do not handle probabilistic protocols, where randomness is not
only used in cryptographic primitives, but for random decisions. These
are essential for some security goals [ASW09] and can be used to model
random routing in anonymity protocols.
We propose a model that overcomes these shortcomings by a thorough
treatment of knowledge and probabilism. Since standard ATL∗ does not
have epistemic or probabilistic features, we need a more expressive logic
to describe security goals. We use QAPI [Sch10a], a very expressive ex-
tension of ATL∗. In addition to epistemic and probabilistic aspects, QAPI
allows explicit reasoning and quantification of strategies similarly to (the
non-epistemic, non-probabilistic) strategy logic [CHP07], of which QAPI is
a proper generalization. This allows to express dependencies between strate-
gies of different coalitions, as for example knowledge that one coalition has
about the behavior of others. We use this powerful feature to express abuse-
freeness of contract signing protocols. Our contributions are as follows:
1. We define a symbolic model for protocol analysis treating explicit
knowledge, incomplete information, and probabilistic protocols.
2. We show that the question whether a protocol satisfies a security prop-
erty (specified by a QAPI-formula) in our model is decidable for both
active and passive adversaries.
Our proof implies that relevant strategies can always be finitely repre-
sented. This, and the fact that strategies only use “realistic” information,
implies that if there is an “attack” on a protocol, the resulting adversary can
be implemented in software. Similarly, if a protocol is “secure,” the relevant
strategies for honest principals can be implemented.
As an example, consider the following coin-flipping protocol: Bob ran-
domly chooses a bit b1 ∈ {0, 1} and a long random value N , and sends
hash(〈b1, N〉) to Alice. Alice randomly chooses b2 ∈ {0, 1} and sends b2 to
Bob. He then sends N and b1 to Alice, who verifies that these values match
the hash. The outcome of the protocol is the bit b1 ⊕ b2, the main security
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property is that neither Alice nor Bob have a strategy to dictate the out-
come. In the classical, complete-information setting, this security property
is not met: Here Alice may choose b2 depending on the value of b1, and thus
can completely control the resulting bit b1 ⊕ b2. Intuitively, the protocol is
secure, since Alice is unable to determine b1 from the hash value. Our model
allows to formally specify and prove the protocol secure.
In this report, we only treat the above toy protocol in detail. As an
additional application, we prove that abuse-freeness can be formalized in our
model. As a corollary we obtain that abuse-freeness is decidable, resolving
an open question from [KKW06].
Related Work. In the above-mentioned [KKT07], a decision algorithm
for (non-epistemic, complete-information, non-probabilistic) strategic prop-
erties of protocols is given. The authors establish bounds for decidability
of protocol verification that preclude generalizations of our results to vari-
ous extensions of our model that allow infinite protocol runs. In [KKW09]
a decidability result for a strategic property (balance) of contract-signing
protocols was established. This result follows from our decidability result.
In the very influential paper [BAN90], a logic for authentication proto-
cols was introduced, which models knowledge gained during the run of an
authentication protocol.
[ASW09] defines a model for probabilistic protocols, however no decid-
ability result is proven. We significantly generalize that model in several
directions: First, we take into account explicit knowledge and incomplete in-
formation strategies. Second, we treat arbitrary term signatures with equa-
tional theories instead of only nonces and signatures as in [ASW09]. Further,
we allow arbitrarily complex terms.
Organization. In Section 1 and 2, we define syntax and semantics of the
protocol model. In Section 3, we briefly introduce the semantics of QAPI.
Section 4 contains our main result: The question whether a given protocol
satisfies a given security property (i.e., a formula) is decidable. Section 5 con-
tains applications: A treatment of the coin-flipping protocol, our decidability
result for abuse-freeness, and a brief discussion of anonymous broadcast. In
Section 6, we prove our main result and conclude in Section 7.
1 Syntax: Specifying a Protocol
1.1 Two Examples
Before introducing our formal model, we consider two examples: The coin-
flipping protocol (see Introduction), which we fully specify in our model, and
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an excerpt of a contract-signing protocol.
The Coin-Flipping Protocol In the protocol, Bob chooses his bit first and
thus cannot dictate the outcome of the protocol (“cheating” is noticed by
Alice when verifying the hash value). We consider the more interesting case
of dishonest Alice: Only the hash function prevents her from dictating the
result unilaterally. Hence the more interesting case is when we identify Alice
with the adversary, and assume that she will not follow the protocol. In
Figure 1, we show the formalizations of both Alice’s and Bob’s role in the
protocol in our model; the structure of Alice’s role is shown on the left-
hand side, the modeling of Bob’s role is shown on the right-hand side. As
mentioned above, we first discuss the case that Bob follows the protocol:
Dashed lines represent messages received by Bob, solid ones correspond to
messages sent by him. The message 〈α,N〉 is a pair containing the bit α and
the long random value N . The probabilities 1
2
express that Bob chooses the
bits 0 and 1 with probability 1
2
each. Omitted probabilities have the value 1.
Note that different messages from Alice (0 or 1) lead to different reactions
(follow-up states) for Bob. We omit error states for syntactically incorrect
incoming messages, etc. Since our model is concurrent, we add a dummy
sequence for the protocol step when Alice is active. The security property
for the protocol is captured in the following formula:





The variable S is instanciated with a universally quantified strategy played
by Alice. The formula expresses that for every1 strategy S, if the adversary
Alice follows the strategy, she only has a probability of 1
2
to reach a state in
which both random bits are the same and hence the result bit is 0; the 1-case
is symmetric. We define the logic in detail in Section 3.
For the case that Alice follows the protocol, we also discuss her modelling
in our model (see also Figure 1). To increase readability, instead of using
the formal operators that allow Alice to extract the message received in the
i-th protocol step, we simply write ri to access the corresponding term. The
test (see below for a formal definition of tests) true represents a test that is
always true, for example x = x, where x is a variable. In the example, this is
used when the hash value of Bob’s pair 〈b1, N〉 is received: At this point of
the protocol run, no tests are performed, the value is merely stored for later
reference.2
1The index 3 expresses that the strategy may not break the hash function, see later for
details.





















































〈0, N〉 〈0, N〉 〈1, N〉 〈1, N〉
Figure 1: Specification of Coin-Flipping Protocol
The final receive step made by Alice is the most important one: Here
she receives the actual pair 〈b1, N〉 from Bob. Alice now needs to check that
Bob did not cheat (i.e., that this pair is indeed consistent with the hash value
received earlier in the protocol run), and to compute the result of the coinflip.
In order to implement this, she uses the following test: For α ∈ {0, 1}, the
test bobbitα is the conjunction
(r2 = hash(r4))
∧
(Π1(r4) = α) ,
this test is true if and only if the pair sent by Bob in protocol step 4
matches the earlier sent hash value and the bit contained in Bob’s commit-
that the received message is a complicated term instead of a simple hash value. However,
this is unnecessary, since the test performed in the final step involves comparing the
message received here to a hash value which Alice computes in the final step—if this test
is successful, then in particular, the value first received from Bob is a hash value.
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ment is α. Recall that the operator Π1 denotes extraction of the first element
of a pair. Depending on this test and on her own previously chosen bit, Alice






11, where the bit combina-
tions αβ denote the 4 possible choices of bits by Alice and Bob (the first bit
is Bob’s random choice, the second one Alice’s).
Wait State in a Contract Signing Protocol Consider the protocol excerpt in
Figure 2. There are two possible incoming messages: The empty term ε and
a signature of some text. If ε is received, there are three possible reactions:
1. send an abort-message, and move to an “aborted” state, 2. move into a
waiting state, 3. randomly choose between the first two alternatives. If the
signature is received, an ok -state is reached and an accept message sent.











Figure 2: Protocol State Example
The random choice in the
example is contrived, how-
ever there are protocols where
randomized decisions are es-
sential, e.g., the contract
signing protocol introduced
in [ASW09], the coin-flipping
protocol discussed above, and
random routing.
The formal protocol defi-
nition below is as expected—
however we make the follow-
ing generalization: In the ex-
amples, incoming messages are compared to some “expected” message. In
general, principals may not know (or be interested in) the exact message, but
only some properties of it. Such properties are modeled as tests performed on
messages. As an example, when Alice receives the second message from Bob
in the coin-flipping protocol, she verifies that the hash value of this message
is exactly the first message she received. This can be done using the test
hash(r2) = r1, where r1 and r2 refer to the two messages received from Bob.
1.2 Formalizing Protocol States
Let IDs be a set of identities in a PKI. Let N be the disjoint union of the
infinite sets NA and Ni for each i ∈ IDs (nonces generated by the adversary
and honest participants). Let X = {x1, x2, . . . } be an infinite set of variables.
Let Σt be a term signature containing function symbols with assigned arities
representing cryptographic primitives. The set of terms TΣt is defined as
usual inductively on N , X, and symbols from Σt. We assume that for each
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i ∈ IDs, there are constants i, pki and ski in Σt, denoting the name, public
and private key of i, and that Σt contains operations to construct tuples and
projection functions to access their components. For C ⊆ IDs, the set TC is
the set of terms constructable from X ∪
⋃
i∈C Ni∪NA where no ski for i /∈ C
appears. We call these terms C-terms. These can be constructed with access
to the secret keys and nonces of members of C. We write TA instead of TC if
C is clear from the context, to highlight that these terms can be constructed
by the adversary when the identities in C are corrupted (i.e., the adversary










xr , xt, pkxi
)
= ok
for i ∈ {1, 2} ,Πi〈t1, t2〉 = ti
Figure 3: Equational theory for asymmetric
encryption, signatures, and pairing
We additionally assume a
convergent equational theory
E associated with Σt, and de-
note the resulting congruence
relation with≡E. See Figure 3
for an example theory describ-
ing public-key encryption, sig-
natures, and pairing; in the
equations xi refers to an iden-
tity, xt is a term (message),
and xr represents randomization used in the application of cryptographic
primitives. The (uniquely determined) normal form of a term t, denoted
with [[t]], is obtained by exhaustive application of simplification rules from





More formally, an equation over Σt is simply a pair of Σt-terms (l, r),
which we also write as l = r, where l is the left-hand side, and r is the
right-hand side of the equation. An equational theory E over Σt is a set of







models that when encrypting a term (represented with the variable Xt)
with the public key of some identity (represented with the variable Xi), using
some randomness specified in the variable Xr, and decrypting the term with
the private key of the same identity, then the result is the originally encrypted
term.
The above equation can be seen as a “simplification rule,” which allows
to transform a complex term representing the ciphertext into a simpler term,
representing the plaintext. It is of course possible that the plaintext itself
again is a ciphertext, hence the equation can possibly be performed multiple
times, each step leading to a simpler term. However, after some finite number
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of steps, the resulting plaintext is not an encryption of another term anymore,
and the rule cannot be applied further.
More generally, an equational theory E induces a reduction relation E,
where for two terms t1 and t2, we have that (t1, t2) ∈E (also written as
t1 E t2) if t2 can be obtained from t1 by applying a rule in E, i.e., if there
is an equation l = r in E such that
– the set of variables of l is Xl =
{





xl1, . . . , x
l
n,
– the set of variables of r is Xr = {xr1, . . . , xrm} for some variables
xr1, . . . , x
r
m (the sets Xl and Xr need not be disjoint), and
– there is a function σ : Xl ∪Xr → TΣt such that
1. l[xl1/σ(x
l












In this case, t1 is an instance of l, and t2 is the instance of r which agrees
with t1 on the values on the appearing variables. Hence it is possible to apply
the equation l = r to obtain t2 from t1.
With ∗E, we denote the reflexive and transitive closure of E, with ≡E
we denote the reflexive, symmetric, and transitive closure of E. Terms t1
and t2 are called Σ
t-equivalent, if t1 ≡E t2. The relation E is confluent, if
for all t, t1, t2 with t ∗E t1 and t E t2, there is some t
′ with t1 E t′ and
t2 E t′. The relation E is terminating if there is no infinite sequence of
terms t1, t2, . . . such that for all i we have ti 6= ti+1 and ti E ti+1. The
theory E is convergent if E is both confluent and terminating.
A term t ∈ TΣt is irreducible if tE t′ implies t = t′, in this case we say
that t is in normal form. If E is convergent, then for each term t there is
a uniquely determined term t′ such that t′ is in normal form and t∗E t
′, we
denote this term with [[t]]. If is easy to see that if E is convergent, then
terms are equivalent if and only if they have the same normal form.
A message is a variable-free term in normal form. If x is a variable and t, t′
are terms, then with t[x/t′] we denote the term resulting from simultaneously
replacing in t every occurrence of x with t′.
Definition An atomic C-test [KKW06] is a pair (M,M ′) of C-terms
where exactly one variable x appears in M and M ′. A message m satisfies
(M,M ′), if M [x/m] ≡E M ′[x/m]. A C-test is a Boolean combination
of atomic C-tests, with the obvious semantics. Messages m and m′ are
C-indistinguishable if there is no C-test that exactly one of them satisfies.
The definition extends to sequences of messages in the obvious way. We
now define local protocol states. These specify how an incoming message
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is handled in a step of the protocol: Depending on the properties of the
message (modelled with a set of tests), there are different options (called




probabilities for the coin flip protocol), these options are probability distri-
butions over actions, where an action consists of a reply message and a local
state change. In the definition below, the parsing sequence corresponds to
the dashed lines in the earlier graphical examples, while the send sequence
formalizes the solid lines. A state therefore consists of the dashed lines orig-
inating at the same point plus their solid successors.
Definition A local protocol state w is either a special symbol Finished or
consists of
– a parsing sequence t1, . . . , tk, where each element is a test,
– a send sequence (s11 , α1,1), . . . , (s1,l, α1,l), (s2,1, α2,1), . . . , (sk,l, αk,l),
where each si,j is a term, and αi,j ≥ 0 is a rational number with∑l
j=1 αi,j = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
If w is not Finished, then a number i ∈ {1, . . . , k} is a choice in w, and l
is the randomization degree of w. We also call such states regular protocol
states.
A protocol role is a “program” for a principal as the specifications of
Alice and Bob in Figure 1. It combines states into a tree, modeling different
possible protocol executions. We assume sufficiently many copies of Finished,
so that a protocol role may have different final states.
Definition A protocol role R consists of a finite directed tree (V,E), where
V is a set of local protocol states and E is a set of labeled edges such that
the following holds:
– If w ∈ V is regular with k choices and randomization degree l, then w
has k · l successors with edges labeled with (i, j) for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
j ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
– If w ∈ V is a copy of Finished, then w does not have any successor.
– There is an identity i ∈ IDs such that every term in every appearing
regular protocol state is an i-term, i is also called the identity of R.
The requirement that the identity exists ensures that a protocol role uses
a single private key only. A k-roles protocol is a tuple Pr = (R1, . . . ,Rk),
where each Ri is a protocol role.
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2 Semantics: Executing a Protocol
We first informally describe the execution of protocols and then formally
define it with a game structure containing all available actions and conse-
quences (see also [KKT07]). We re-use notation from above, in particular, k
denotes the number of honest protocol participants. Messages sent by princi-
pals are tuples, where for each principal, the incoming message in each state
is a (k+1)-ary tuple, which in component i contains a message from principal
i ∈ {1, . . . , k} or the adversary if i = k + 1. Analogously, the message sent
in each round is a tuple with (k+ 1) entries, where the i-th entry is intended
to be sent to principal i, or to the adversary if i = k + 1.
In a protocol run, an honest principal h ∈ {1, . . . , k} acts as follows:
In each state, he analyzes the incoming message tuple, and checks for each
test from the parsing sequence whether the message satisfies it. To allow
comparing parts of the currently received message to previous messages, the
test is applied to the entire sequence of messages received so far by the
principal. If the test tc is satisfied, a number d ∈ {1, . . . , l} is chosen randomly
according to the distribution specified by αc,1, . . . , αc,l, and the term sc,d is
the reply sent by h. This term may contain a variable, which again refers to
the sequence of previously received messages, allowing parts of these to be
included in the outgoing message. The local successor state is determined by
the outgoing edge (c, d) of the current one. If the incoming message satisfies
more than one of the tests, i.e., if more than one c above is possible, the
principal can make a strategic choice by choosing the one to apply. To avoid
cumbersome case distinctions, we require that for every message, there must
be a test that it satisfies3.
The adversary may send arbitrary terms that he can construct.
2.1 Concurrent Game Structures
The formal protocol model combines a set of “global states” of a protocol
(a global state essentially contains the local state of every involved party),
with the possible actions (called “moves”) and consequences thereof for every
party. The standard way to specify strategic situations as these are concur-
rent game structures (CGS). We use the definition from [Sch10b], which
models probabilistic games and incomplete information:
3This can be achieved by adding dummy tests and reactions; this also models that
realistically, principals may choose to ignore incoming messages. If unwanted, one can
require that honest principals only use protocol steps obtained from using the dummy test
if no other test applies, our results hold for both versions.
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Definition A concurrent game structure is a tuple C = (Σ, Q,P, π,∆, δ, eq)
where
– Σ and P are non-empty, finite sets of players and propositional variables,
Q is a non-empty set of states,
– π : P→ 2Q is a propositional assignment (π(p) is the set of states where
p is true),
– ∆ is a move function assigning to each state q ∈ Q and player a ∈ Σ
a nonempty set ∆(q, a) of moves available at state q to player a. For
A ⊆ Σ and q ∈ Q, an (A, q)-move is a function c mapping each a ∈ A
to a move c(a) ∈ ∆(q, a).
– δ is a probabilistic transition function which for each state q and (Σ, q)-
move c, specifies a discrete probability distribution δ(q, c) on Q (the
distribution of the state obtained when in q, all players perform their
move as specified by c),
– eq is an information function eq : {1, . . . , n} × Σ → P(Q×Q), where
n is a natural number, and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a ∈ Σ, eq(i, a)
is an equivalence relation on Q. Each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is called a degree
of information.
A subset A ⊆ Σ is a coalition of C. We write q1 ∼eqi(A) q2 for
(q1, q2) ∈ ∩a∈Aeq(i, a). If q1 ∼eqi(a) q2, then the player a cannot distinguish
states q1 and q2 (if i denotes the degree of information available to him).
Multiple degrees of information allows to reason about situations where e.g.,
the adversary is assumed to be able to break cryptography, but not see other
principal’s internal states, or situations where he is restricted by cryptogra-
phy.
2.2 The Concurrent Game Structure for Protocol Ex-
ecution
We now formalize the protocol execution described earlier, by defining a CGS
that contains the possible actions of the involved parties (honest principals
and the adversary). In the state description below, C is the set of corrupted
identities, each honest principal h ∈ {1, . . . , k} is in state wh. For each
principal i ∈ {1, . . . , k,A}, the sequence Mi contains the messages received
so far. The sequence movesA records the moves performed by the adversary.
The numbers ch and dh are the strategic and random choices made by h.
Variables of the CGS allow to express facts about the local state of honest
principals.
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Definition Let Pr = (R1, . . . ,Rk) be a protocol. The CGS induced by Pr
is defined as CPr = (Σ, Q,P, π,∆, δ, eq), where
– Σ = {1, . . . , k,A},
– Q consists of tuples of the form q =
(C,w1,M1, . . . , wk,Mk,MA,movesA), where C ⊆ IDs, for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, wi is a protocol state of Ri, Mi andMA are sequences
of messages, and movesA is a sequence of terms.
– for each protocol state w occurring in Pr and each h ∈ {1, . . . , k} there
is a variable sthw that is true in q as above if and only if wh = w,
– for a state q as above where for all h ∈ {1, . . . , k}, wh has kh choices,
randomization degree lh, parsing sequence t
h






1,1), . . . ,(s
h
kh,lh
, αhkh,lh), the available moves are as follows: For A,
every term mA ∈ TA is a move, for an honest principal h ∈ {1, . . . , k},
the number ch ∈ {1, . . . , kh} is a move if and only if Mh satisfies
the test thch . The transition function δ is defined as follows: For the
move determined by the adversary move mA and the principal moves
(c1, . . . , ck) and numbers d1, . . . , dk, where 1 ≤ dh ≤ lh, there is a
successor state q′ = (C,w′1,M′1, . . . , w′k,M′k,M′A,movesA◦mA), where
• w′h is the unique successor of wh in Rh connected with the edge
labeled (ch, dh),
• to define the sequences M′j, we denote with Mi for i ∈
{1, . . . , k,A} the message sent by i, which is [[sici,di [x/Mi]]] if
i ≤ k, or [[mA[x/MA]]] if i = A,
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k,A}, the new sequence M′i is obtained by
adding to the sequence Mi a (k + 1)-ary tuple containing in its
j-th component the i-th component of Mj (the i-th component of
Mj is the term that j sends to i),






If a principal is in a copy of the state Finished, he only has dummy
moves, i.e., does not change local state, receive or send messages any-
more.
– We define three degrees of information: For a player a ∈ Σ,
1. eq(1, a) is the equality relation (this models complete informa-
tion),
2. eq(2, a) is the equivalence relation where two states are equiva-
lent if and only if the principal is in the same local state4, and
the component Ma is the same in both states (this models local
information with ability to break cryptography)
3. eq(3, a) is the equivalence relation where states are equivalent if
4The local state of A consists of the set C and the sequence movesA.
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and only if the principal is in the same local state4, and compo-
nents Ma are a-indistinguishable (C-indistinguishable if a = A).
For each C ⊆ IDs, there is an initial state qCinit =
(C, r1, ε, r2, ε, . . . , rk, ε, ε, ε), where ri is the root of Ri. In this state,
no message has been sent, every principal is in its initial local state, and the
adversary has access to the keys of all identities in C. This models static
corruption, where a set of identities (fixed before the protocol run) is treated
as adversial.
Formally, a principal receives a single message in each step. This message
is a tuple containing messages from every protocol principal: Several mes-
sages can be received, processed, and answered simultaneously. Messages
are immediately delivered to the intended recipients: There are direct secure
channels between principals. Realistically, use of such channels will be re-
stricted by introducing so-called buffer principals which the adversary may
instruct to delay/drop messages. These are modeled as ordinary protocol
roles relaying messages. Hence our model allows for flexible “implementa-
tions” of secure channels. These also allow to model passive adversaries, by
only letting honest principals communicate via these buffers, and ignoring
incoming messages from the adversary (who is active by default).
There is no formal requirement forcing messages to be the intended
(k + 1)-ary sequences. If messages of a different form are sent by some
i ∈ {1, . . . , k,A}, then some entries in the tuples are not defined, and some
possible receivers do not receive a message from i.
3 QAPI: ATL with probabilism, knowledge,
and explicit strategies
To express security goals, we use the ATL∗-variant QAPI introduced
in [Sch10a]. We briefly introduce syntax and semantics of QAPI. We only
define the subset of the available features of QAPI that is most relevant to
expressing properties of cryptographic protocols. However, we mention that
our decidability result holds for the complete language.
3.1 Formulas
QAPI extends ATL∗ with epistemic features, probabilities, and explicit
strategies. Formulas may contain variables S1, . . . , Sn referring to strate-
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gies, these will be bound by quantifiers. This allows explicit reasoning about
strategies.
Definition The set of QAPI-formulas for a CGS C is defined as follows:
– A propositional variable of C is a state formula, conjunctions and nega-
tions of state (path) formulas for C are state (path) formulas for C,
– every state formula is a path formula,
– if A1, . . . , An are coalitions, J is one of ≤, <,≥, >, ψ is a
path formula, and S1, . . . , Sn are variables for strategies, then
〈〈A1 : S1, . . . , An : Sn〉〉Jα ψ is a state formula,
– if A is a coalition, i is a degree of information, and ψ is a state formula,
then KAi ψ is a state formula,
– If ϕ1 and ϕ2 are path formulas, then Xϕ1, Pϕ1, X
−1ϕ1, and ϕ1Uϕ2 are
path formulas.
Intuitively, 〈〈A1 : S1, . . . , An : Sn〉〉Jα ψ expresses that if the coalitions
A1, . . . , An play the strategies referred to by S1, . . . , Sn, then for every
possible behavior of the remaining players, the probability that the resulting
sequence of states satisfies the formula ψ is J α. The formula KAi ψ expresses
“coalition A knows that ψ is true (with information degree i).” We use
standard abbreviations like ϕ ∨ ψ = ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), ♦ϕ = true Uϕ, and ϕ =
¬♦¬ϕ.
3.2 Strategies and Semantics
Strategies are defined as usual: For a player a, an a-strategy is a function s
assigning a move from ∆(q, a) to each state q. It is i-uniform, if q1 ∼eqi(a) q2
implies s(q1) = s(q2): In states that a player cannot tell apart with informa-
tion degree i, he performs the same move. For a coalition A, an A-strategy
is a family (sa)a∈A, where each sa is an a-strategy, it is i-uniform if every sa
is. Our strategies are memoryless : In our model, principals store all relevant
information—each state in CPr has a unique history. We now define the se-
mantics of the subset of QAPI that we use. Formulas are evaluated on states
or on paths, where a path is a sequence λ of states in a CGS C. With λ[i] we
denote the ith state in λ.
Definition Let C = (Σ, Q,P, π,∆, δ, eq) be a CGS, let ϕ be a state formula,
let ψ1 and ψ2 be path formulas, let S1, . . . , Sn be strategies instantiating the
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variables S1, . . . , Sn, let λ be a path, let t ∈ N,let q ∈ Q be a state, let
−→
S be
an abbreviation for (S1, . . . , Sn) Then
– C,
−→
S , q |= p iff q ∈ π(p) for p ∈ P,
– negation and conjunction are treated as usual,
– (λ, t),
−→
S |= ϕ iff C,
−→
S , λ[t] |= ϕ,
– (λ, t),
−→















S |= ψ1Uψ2 iff there is some i ≥ t such that (λ, i),
−→
S |= ψ2 and
(λ, j),
−→
S |= ψ1 for all t ≤ j < i,
– C,
−→
S , q |= KAi ϕ1 iff C,
−→
S , q′ |= ϕ1 for all q′ ∈ Q with q′ ∼eqi(A) q,
– C,
−→
S , q |= 〈〈Ai1 : Si1 , . . . , Aik : Sik〉〉
Jα ψ iff when coalition Aij plays
5
the Aij -strategy Sij for all j, then the resulting path satisfies ψ
with probability J α, for every possible behavior of the players in
Σ \ (Ai1 ∪ · · · ∪ Aik).
This definition treats formulas where strategies are already fixed as in-
stantiations of the variables Si. A quantified strategy formula is a state for-
mula as above, prefixed by a quantifier block where each strategy variable
Si is quantified with ∃i or ∀i for an information degree i. This expresses
“there is (for all) i-uniform strategies,” the semantics is the natural one:
∃i1S1∀i2S2 . . . ∃inSnϕ is true in a state q if there is a i1-uniform strategy S1
such that for all i2-uniform strategies S2, . . . , there is an in-uniform strategy
Sn such that this choice of strategies satisfies ϕ according to the definition
above. Quantification and explicit strategies lead to an expressive logic that
can express dependencies between strategies, e.g., captures situations where a
player has knowledge about strategies played by others. In particular, QAPI
allows very flexible treatment of the behavior of the “counter-coalition:” In
ATL∗, 〈〈A〉〉ϕ implicitly quantifies about arbitrary behavior of the players in
A := Σ \ A. With explicit strategies and quantification, QAPI can express,
e.g., that A follow (i) their “currently played” strategy, (ii) a specific strat-
egy to stop A from reaching the goal ϕ (iii) or perform an arbitrary sequence
possible not consistent with any uniform strategy.
This can be expressed with
〈〈
A : SA, A : SA
〉〉
ϕ for appropriate variables,
or (for the third option) by not mentioning A in the operator at all—not all
5If a player a appears in more than one of the Aij , he follows strategy Sij with j =
min
{




coalitions need to appear in an application of the 〈〈A1 : S1, . . . , Ak : Sk〉〉Jα-
operator. Formal definitions are in [Sch10a].
4 Main Result
We show that security of protocols in our model is decidable:
Theorem 4.1 There is an algorithm which, given a protocol Pr, a set C
of corrupted identities, and a quantified strategy formula ϕ, decides whether
CPr, qCinit |= ϕ.
Intuitively, the theorem is true due to the following: Since honest princi-
pals only analyze the terms visible to them up to a bounded depth, the con-
tent of terms below a certain depth is irrelevant (see also [RT03]). Therefore,
one can restrict the adversary to send terms with bounded depth. This gives
an essentially finite model and allows application of standard model-checking
algorithms. The actual proof is more involved because it has to ensure that
not only reachability properties, but also strategic and epistemic properties
are identical in the original and the restricted model. The complete proof
can be found in Section 6 below.
Extensions Our model can be extended in many ways. For changing net-
work configurations, one can define variations where communication between
some principals is not allowed at all, or only allowed after a certain number
of protocol steps have been performed, etc.
Also, we can enrich the set of propositional variables of CPr with state-
ments t(Mi) ≡E t′(Mj) for terms t and t′ and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k,A}, with
the obvious semantics: This models tests on messages visible to principals i
and j. In combination with the knowledge operator, this allows formulas to
explicitly reason about the knowledge that a principal has about properties
of messages received by himself or others during the protocol run.
One can also adept our model to obtain a sequential one. Our treatment
of strategies allows to reason about fair scheduling, etc. We do not formalize
these extensions, however we mention that decidability is maintained for the
extended models.
5 Applications
We briefly discuss applications of our model. Treatment of uniform strategies
allows more fine-grained analysis of protocols, since the appearing strategies
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can in fact be implemented. In particular, if an analysis detects an adversary-
strategy “breaking” the protocol, this corresponds to a realistic attack. Sim-
ilarly, existence of strategies for honest principals (as, e.g., required by the
timeliness property for contract signing protocols) also implies the existence
of a strategy that honest principals can in fact follow with the available
information.6 Restriction to these strategies allows to show that the coin-
flipping protocol is secure, which cannot be done in complete-information
models. Other examples for applications are anonymous broadcast protocols
and abuse-freeness of contract signing protocols, here epistemic capabilities
of our model play a crucial role.
5.1 The Coin-Flipping Protocol
Proposition 5.1 The state q
{Alice}
init of the CGS induced by the coin-flipping





The formula is satisfied because the messages hash(〈0, N〉) and
hash(〈1, N〉) are indistinguishable for Alice, since she does not know the
value N . Therefore, a 3-uniform strategy has to choose the same action for
both of Bob’s possible messages.
5.2 Abuse-freeness
Abuse-freeness of e.g., contract signing protocols is the following: Assume
Alice wants to buy a house from Bob for some amount of money, and the
following situation arises: Bob has a strategy to “abort” the signing (ensuring
that Alice does not get Bob’s signature), another strategy to “close the deal”
(to receive Alice’s signature), and further Bob can prove this fact to an
outsider Charlie. Then Bob can convince Charlie to pay more for the house
than Alice offers. A protocol where such a situation does not arise is abuse-
free.
Definitions of abuse-freeness are non-trivial [KR02, KKW06], but it is
clear that this property contains both epistemic and strategic properties:
Roughly, a protocol is abuse-free if there is no reachable state where Charlie
knows that the adversary has strategies satisfying the above conditions.
We prove that the definition from [KKW06] can be expressed in our
model. In addition to the obviously required epistemic aspects, our formula
expressing abuse-freeness makes extensive use of QAPI’s ability to reason
about strategies directly: Our modeling of abuse-freeness quite naturally
6Using information degree 1, our model can treat complete-information strategies as
well.
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requires that other principals “know” the set of proofs accepted by Charlie.
Since accepting/rejecting a proof is a choice by Charlie, this set of valid proofs
corresponds to an accept/reject strategy played by him. The set of accepted
proofs needs to be constant throughout the protocol run. Hence for consistent
behavior, it is essential that Charlie does not change his strategy, even if other
principals change theirs. This requirement cannot be expressed in standard
ATL∗: Here, an application of the 〈〈A〉〉-operator lets players who are not
members of A “forget” about their currently played strategy. QAPI allows
to directly assign an arbitrarily quantified strategy to a coalition, where the
same (variable for a) strategy may be used multiple times in a formula.
Therefore, the “consistency” of Charlie and similar aspects required in the
construction can be expressed in QAPI. The below result that abuse-freeness
can be expressed in our model and our main result imply
Corollary 5.2 Abuse freeness as defined in [KKW06] is decidable.
The remainder of Section 5.2 proves Corollary 5.2. We first, in Sec-
tion 5.2.1, recall the definition of abuse-freeness given in [KKW06]. In Sec-
tion 5.2.2 we prove the result, and in Section 5.2.3 we consider some arguably
more natural variations of the definition.
5.2.1 Formal definition of abuse freeness
Abuse-freeness is closely related to balance: Let ϕ1 and ϕ2 be formulas de-
scribing protocol outcomes. In the contract-signing example mentioned in
Section 5.2, these might be formulas encoding that Bob has obtained a con-
tract with Alice, or that the protocol run (for Alice) is over without Alice
having received a contract. A state q of the protocol execution is (ϕ1, ϕ2)-
unbalanced, if the adversary has a strategy ensuring that the resulting pro-
tocol run satisfies ϕ1, and a (potentially different) strategy to ensure that
it satisfies ϕ2. A protocol is (ϕ1, ϕ2)-abusive, if the adversary can reach an
(ϕ1, ϕ2)-unbalanced state, and additionally the adversary can present a proof
of this fact to an outside party Charlie. This informal definition will be for-
malized in the sequel. In the following, we often only write “abusive” and
“unbalanced” for (ϕ1, ϕ2)-abusive and (ϕ1, ϕ2)-unbalanced.
When describing abuse-freeness in game-theoretic settings, often an ex-
plicit variable prove2C [KR02] has been used to label the states in which the
adversary can produce a corresponding proof. In [KKW06], Kähler, Küsters,
and Wilke presented a definition of abuse-freeness that does not require the
explicit labeling of these states, by formalizing what it means for the ad-
versary to convince an outside party of the fact that a state of the protocol
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is unbalanced. Their notion of abuse-freeness deals with deterministic pro-
tocols only and is offline, i.e., Charlie receives only a single message, and
does not actively take part in the protocol run. Based on this message alone,
Charlie decides whether to believe Bob the adversary or not. Since Charlie
cannot force the adversary to present a proof as soon as one is available, the
adversary can only convince Charlie that he is or was in an unbalanced state
(the protocol run may be completed at the time that Charlie receives the
proof from the adversary). Formally, the definition uses tests that Charlie
may perform on proofs presented by the adversary, where the definition of
a test is the same one we use, see Section 1. A test θ is called convincing
in [KKW06], if every state q in the protocol run in which the adversary can
produce a message m that satisfies θ has the property that there is an ances-
tor state q′ of q such that 1. q′ is (ϕ1, ϕ2)-unbalanced, 2. in q
′, the adversary
can produce a message satisfying θ.
The second condition is necessary to, for instance, preclude protocols in
which the adversary can produce proofs of unbalance of a previous state
only after the protocol run is essentially over. The definition ensures that a
proof can always be generated in the state that actually is unbalanced. A
protocol is abusive if there is a convincing test θ and a reachable state where
the adversary can produce a message satisfying θ, such a state is called θ-
possible. This is a state in which the adversary can convince Charlie (if the
latter property is not satisfied, for example the always-false test could be
used). A protocol is abuse-free otherwise.
5.2.2 Proof of Expressibility and Decidability
We now show that the question whether a protocol is abuse-free is decidable
for protocols that can be expressed in our model7, resolving an open question
from [KKW06].
We mention that the version of abuse-freeness that we treat in this section
is a slight modification of the definition in [KKW06]. The difference is the
treatment of knowledge of strategies: Our notion of a strategy essentially
requires participants not only to have, but also to know a strategy, while the
definition from [KKW06] also allows strategies which exist, even are uniform,
but cannot be “identified” by the principals. We feel that requiring strategies
to be identifiable is more natural, see also [JvdH04]. However, we stress that
the decidability result for the original definition from [KKW06] is true as
well. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 5.2.3. We also mention
7The model in [KKW06] is general enough to cover protocols represented by arbitrary
Turing machines, hence in general abuse-freeness is obviously undecidable.
21
that for the protocols treated in [KKW06], this issue does not arise due to
the relatively simple set of relevant strategies.
In the following, we assume that Alice is the honest protocol participant
(along with other parties required by the protocol like possibly a trusted
third party, buffer principals implementing secure channels, etc), and Bob
is the adversary. Hence formally, we assume that the adversary has access
to Bob’s private key. Obviously, the case of dishonest Alice can be treated
in the same way. Note that the definition of abuse freeness in [KKW06] is
concerned with a deterministic model only, hence in the following we assume
that the protocol does not use probabilism. For easier readability, we omit
probabilities from the occurring formulas; all goals are supposed to be reached
with probability ≥ 1.
We show the following theorem:
Theorem 5.3 There is an algorithm which, when given a protocol Pr and
path formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2 for protocol, produces a protocol Pr
′, and formula
ψabuse such that Pr is (ϕ1, ϕ2)-abusive if and only if CPr′ , q
{B}
init |= ψ.
Obviously, the analogous statement for Alice instead of Bob is true as
well. Due to our main decidability result Theorem 4.1, the above theorem
directly implies Corollary 5.2.
The remainder of this section proves Theorem 5.3. We first explain the
changes made to the protocol Pr to obtain the protocol Pr′. In essence,
Pr′ is obtained from Pr by adding a principal representing Charlie (denoted
with C in the QAPI-formulas below) and a verifier principal (referred to using
V) whose role is to ensure that Charlie only bases his decision whether to
accept the proof of the adversary on knowledge that he has in the model
of [KKW06]. In detail, the changes are as follows:
– we introduce a principal Charlie who receives a message from the ad-
versary at some point during the protocol run,
– we introduce another principal, the verifier, who receives a message
from Charlie at the last step of the protocol, but does not perform any
actions (i.e., the protocol role is simply a line), and has access to the
same private keys as Charlie8,
– the protocol role for Charlie proceeds as follows: As the last two steps
of the protocol, Charlie
8this can be implemented by letting Charlie perform dummy tests which use Charlie’s
secret key, note that nonces produced by Charlie do not appear in the protocol run and
thus are irrelevant
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1. forwards the first message received from the adversary to the veri-
fier (additional messages received from the adversary are ignored)
in the transition to the second-to-last state,
2. nondeterministically moves into either an “accept” or a “reject”
state in the transition to the final state.
Note that in particular, Charlie makes his decision only after the verifier
received Charlie’s message. This is for technical convenience, since it
allows us to express the verifier’s knowledge about Charlie’s decision in
an easy way.
The idea of the construction is the following: At some point during the
protocol run, the adversary sends a message to Charlie. This gives Charlie
additional information beyond the actual content of the message, namely an
upper bound on the number of steps performed in the protocol previous to
the adversary being able to construct the message. Since in the definition
of abuse-freeness from [KKW06], Charlie does not have access to this kind
of information (he only knows the message without any kind of timing in-
formation), we need to make sure that Charlie’s decision—to accept or to
reject the proof—is being made independently of the time when the message
is received. This is realized by including the additional verifier principal: We
require that the verifier knows Charlie’s decision (i.e., Charlie’s final local
state), and the only information that the verifier has about Charlie’s state
is the message which Charlie forwards to him in the final protocol step. Of
course, the adversary is free to send proofs of some states being unbalanced
to the verifier as well, hence the verifier may very well know whether an
unbalanced state has appeared—but this is irrelevant, since it is the task of
the verifier to determine whether Charlie accepts the proof he received from
the adversary, and not to perform any reasoning as to whether a state is
unbalanced. The role of the verifier is merely to “force” Charlie to base his
decision only on the information that we want him to use, i.e., the actual
message received by the adversary.
We now construct the formula ψabuse expressing abusiveness—in the for-
mula, we use letters instead of numbers to denote the principals as Charlie
and the verifier:








ϕ2, i.e., the formula
which expresses that the current state is unbalanced, here SA1 and S
A
2
will be existentially quantified in the quantifier block preceding the
entire formula,
– let ϕver be the formula KV3 〈〈C : SC〉〉 Xacc∨KV3 〈〈C : SC〉〉 Xrej, where acc
and rej are formulas which are true if Charlie is in a local state where
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he accepts, respectively where he rejects, this formula expresses that
in the current state, the verifier knows whether Charlie will move into
the accepting or rejecting state, given that Charlie plays the strategy
referred to with the symbol SC.
– let ϕA−greedy be the formula ¬P ((〈〈A : SA,C : SC〉〉 ((Xrec) ∧ (♦acc))) ∧ ¬Xrec),
where rec is a formula true in exactly those states in which Charlie
has received a message from the adversary. This formula expresses
that (assuming the strategy SA is all-quantified over all complete-
information strategies) the strategy played by the adversary up to now
in the protocol run is “greedy” in the sense that if at some point in the
protocol run it was possible for the adversary to send a message which
eventually leads to Charlie (assuming he is following SC) moving into
the accepting state, then the adversary in fact did send a message to
Charlie in the next step (or previously).
Also, let end be an atomic proposition which is true at the “end of the
protocol run,” i.e., when the verifier has exactly one final action left. Then
the “normal protocol execution,” i.e., the actions of the principals of the
original protocol, are finished by the construction of Charlie and the verifier.
The formula ψabuse is the following:
∃2SA1 ∃2SA2 ∃3SC∃1SΣ∀SA 〈〈C : SC〉〉 ((end→ ϕver)
∧(acc→ (ϕA−greedy → (P(rec′ → X−1ϕunbal))))
∧ 〈〈C : SC,Σ : SΣ〉〉 ♦acc)
Here we use P as abbreviation for ¬P¬, i.e., Pϕ expresses that ϕ is
true at every state in the past. Further, with slight abuse of notation Σ
denotes the principals in the original protocol, i.e., everyone except Charlie
and the verifier, but including the adversary, and rec′ is an atomic proposition
true exactly in those states where Charlie just received the first non-empty
message from the adversary. The reason why the quantification for SA1 and S
A
2
only requires strategies to be uniform for information degree 2 (i.e., essentially
allow the adversary to break cryptography when deciding on his next move—
although not in executing this move, i.e., he may base his decisions on the
content of hidden plaintexts, but may not send these plaintexts) is because
the definition in [KKW06] only requires that strategies for the adversary base
their decisions on the “view” of the adversary, which is appropriate in their
setting (see comments in Section 5.2.3). Hence we use information degree
2 to obtain exactly their definition, for more general situations information
level 3 (i.e., the adversary does not have access to cryptographically hidden
information to decide on his actions) may be more appropriate. Also note
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that SΣ is quantified over complete-information strategies, this expresses that
a state in which acc is true is reachable (note that since the model treated
in [KKW06] is not probabilistic, a state is reachable if and only is the set of
all players has a complete-information strategy to reach it).
The three conjuncts require that
1. at the second-to-last protocol step, i.e., after the verifier received the
forwarded message from Charlie, the verifier knows whether Charlie will
move to an “accept” or a “reject” state in the next transition. This
ensures that, as mentioned above, Charlie bases his decision only on the
content of the first message received from the adversary, and does not
take additional messages or timing information into account. Hence
this establishes that the strategy that Charlie uses (which only allows
him one strategic move, namely to accept or reject the adversary’s
proof) is exactly defined by the outcome of a test.
2. whenever Charlie moves into an accepting state, the state of the proto-
col run in fact was unbalanced in the state where the adversary sent the
proof to Charlie—as long as the adversary played a “greedy” strategy
as explained above. This ensures that the test which Charlie performs
only accepts proofs that actually could be generated in an unbalanced
state.
3. there is a reachable state in which Charlie accepts a proof from the ad-
versary (where Charlie is using the same strategy as mentioned above).
Note that the verifier does not have any strategic decisions, we are only
interested in knowing whether his knowledge suffices to determine Charlie’s
decision. Also note that the formula makes use of the fact that Charlie
“commits” to a fixed strategy in a central way: The formula ϕver states that
if Charlie plays his fixed strategy, and the verifier can rely on this, then
the verifier knows Charlie’s state. For our decidability result it is therefore
essential that QAPI provides a mechanism to express that Charlie continues
the strategy referred to with SC.
We now prove that a protocol is not abuse-free if and only if the protocol
modifies as mentioned above satisfies the formula above.
Proof. First assume that the protocol is not abuse-free. Let θ be a corre-
sponding test, and let q be a θ-possible and unbalanced state, without loss
of generality assume that no proper ancestor of q is θ-possible (by definition
of abusiveness in the sense of [KKW06], the first θ-possible state in a pro-
tocol run must be unbalanced). We define the strategies for Σ and Charlie,
instantiating SΣ and SC, as follows:
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– The adversary and the honest principals of the original protocol run
perform all necessary actions to reach the state q. Note that this is a
state of the original protocol, hence they do not need Charlie’s help to
achieve this.9 After this, the adversary sends a message satisfying the
test θ to Charlie.
– Charlie’s only decision is whether to accept or reject at the end of the
protocol run (the forwarding of the message to the verifier is hard-coded
into Charlie’s definition), he moves into the accepting state if the first
message he received from the adversary satisfies θ and in the rejecting
state otherwise.
– The strategies instantiating SA1 and S
A
1 perform appropriate actions to
reach ϕ1 and ϕ2 whenever possible, i.e., contain hard-coded strategies
to reach ϕ1 and ϕ2 from every state where this is possible.
10
We claim that this choice of strategies satisfies the formula.
1. the first conjunct is satisfied because by definition, the question whether
Charlie moves into an accepting or a rejecting state at the end of the
protocol run only depends on the message he received from the adver-
sary, which is a message that, by construction, the verifier has access to,
and by construction, Charlie and the verifier have access to the same
secret keys, hence they derive the same knowledge from the message
(recall that Charlie’s nonces do not appear in the protocol run, since
Charlie does not construct messages on his own, but only forwards a
message received from the adversary).
2. the second conjunct requires that if Charlie accepts at the end of the
protocol run, and the strategy played by the adversary is greedy, then
the state directly before Charlie received the first message from the
adversary was unbalanced. This is satisfied because the state q is un-
balanced.
3. the final conjunct is satisfied since by construction, the adversary sends
a message satisfying the test θ, and thus by definition of Charlie’s
strategy, he moves into an accepting state.
Hence if the protocol is abusive, then the formula is indeed satisfied in the
initial state of the protocol.
9formally, they reach a state q′ of the new protocol which corresponds to q in a natural
way, it is straight-forward to define this relationship—recall that the additional principals
have no influence on the behavior of the principals present in the original protocol.
10See Section 5.2.3 for a note on the uniformity issues appearing here; in the current
situation, our definition of these strategies implies that information degree 2 is sufficient
to decide on the strategies to apply here.
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For the converse, suppose that the formula is satisfied in the initial state
of the protocol. Note that we can, without loss of generality, assume that the
adversary does not send any messages to the verifier. We construct a test θ
satisfying the requirements. Note that since the strategy used to instantiate
SC has, by the first conjunct of the formula, the property that the choice
depends only on the verifier’s knowledge, which (by definition of knowledge
in our model) means that Charlie’s decision only depends on the outcome
of a test which the verifier can perform on the message received by Charlie,
which is (by construction of Charlie) the first message that Charlie receives
from the adversary. Let θ denote this test.
Obviously, there is a θ-possible state, since a state in which the verifier
accepts is reachable in the protocol due to the final conjunct of the formula.
Hence it remains to show that every θ-possible state is the (not necessarily
direct) successor of an unbalanced state. Thus let q be a θ-possible, reachable
state, without loss of generality assume that no proper predecessor of q is
θ-possible. Now consider a strategy for all principals in Σ that first reaches
the state q without the adversary sending any messages to Charlie, and then
letting the adversary deliver a message satisfying θ to Charlie. Since the
message satisfies θ, Charlie will move to the accepting state at the end of
the protocol run. By construction, since no predecessor of q is θ-possible,
the adversary’s strategy is greedy, i.e., the protocol run satisfies ϕA−greedy.
Therefore, the second conjunct requires that the state directly preceding the
one in which Charlie receives the first message from the adversary. i.e., the
state q, is unbalanced. This concludes the proof. 
Again, note that our proof heavily relies on QAPI’s ability to directly
refer to strategies in the formula themselves, since this allowed us to express
that the verifier knows Charlie’s decision—this is only possible if the verifier
can rely on the strategy which Charlie players. Another, related, way to
achieve a similar effect is to use variants of ATL that use commitment and
include a mechanism for players to know that others have committed to a
certain strategy.
5.2.3 On variations of abuse-freeness
We note that different notions of abuse-freeness can also be captured in our
model. As mentioned in the previous section, the definition of abuse-freeness
in [KKW06] grants the adversary additional knowledge to identify a strategy,
in this section we show that this notion of abuse-freeness can be defined in
our model as well (and thus is decidable). We also comment on natural
variations of the definition of abuse-freeness.
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If we assume that Charlie has inside information about the protocol run
(including the number of steps that have been performed), then the situation
is much simpler, in particular there is no need to introduce a verifier as done
above. In this case, abusiveness can be characterized with a Charlie similarly
as in the previous section and the formula ∃1SΣ 〈〈Σ : SΣ〉〉≥1KC3 X−1ϕunbal,
which (with additional quantification for the adversial strategies mentioned
in ϕunbal) simply states that there is a reachable protocol state in which
Charlie knows that the previous state was unbalanced (he cannot know that
the current state is unbalanced because our model is concurrent and Charlie
does not know actions occurring at the same time as the adversary presenting
his proof to Charlie).
As mentioned before there is a subtle point when dealing with incomplete
information strategies, which is the difference between requiring a strategy to
exist, or to be known. As an illustration, consider the following (contrived)
example: Assume we have a cryptographic protocol where two outcomes,
described by the formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2, are of interest. Assume that there is
a single honest principal, Alice, and her first move is to choose a successor
state out of q1 and q2, these states are indistinguishable for the adversary.
In both cases, the message unbalanced is sent to the adversary. Now, Alice
awaits a message consisting of a single bit, and behaves as follows:
– In state q1, if the bit is 0, she proceeds in a fashion satisfying ϕ1, if the
bit if 1, she chooses actions satisfying ϕ2.
– In the state q2, she behaves exactly the opposite way, i.e., when receiv-
ing the bit 1 the satisfies ϕ1, and on bit 0, she ensures ϕ2.
(Of course here we assume that it is in Alice’s power alone to ensure that
ϕ1 or ϕ2 are satisfied, for example these could be formulas talking only about
the internal state of Alice.)
Consider the state q1. There is a strategy for the adversary to ensure ϕ1
(namely, send bit 0), and a strategy to ensure ϕ2 (send bit 1 instead). These
strategies are constant, therefore in particular, both of them are uniform
(or view -strategies in the terminology of [KKW06]). However, since the
adversary does not have a way of knowing whether the current state is q1 or
q2, the mere existence of such a strategy does not enable the adversary to
actually control the outcome, since he cannot identify the correct strategy.
This distinction is sometimes regarded as the difference between knowledge
de dicto and knowledge de re (see, e.g., [JÅ06]). This topic is not addressed
in [KKW06], our formulation of abuse-freeness does not allow (in the above
example) the adversary to choose different strategies in the states q1 and q2.
However, he is allowed to decide to always act as if the state is q1 and then
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also is regarded as successful in that state, however he is then unsuccessful
in q2—this comes with the additional price that to achieve abusiveness of a
protocol, the adversary needs to be able to convince Charlie that he is in
state q1, not in state q2, which is only possible if Charlie has some knowledge
the adversary does not have. Hence for a passive Charlie, the above situation
will be regarded as not abusive in our model, since the adversary does not
have a way to exploit the theoretically available strategies.
However, if one wants to give the adversary these additional capabili-
ties (essentially only demanding that strategies can be implemented, but not
necessarily identified with the adversary’s knowledge—formally this corre-
sponds to existentially quantify the strategies in nested subformulas of a
formula and not in a quantifier prefix), this can easily be achieved by using
strategy choices instead of strategies which can be used to allow strategies to
depend on the state11, details of this can be found in [Sch10a]—we did not
introduce strategy choices in our introduction of QAPI as the simpler situa-
tion where we just consider strategies is sufficient to express most properties.
Using strategy choices in this way essentially simulates the above-mentioned
quantification of strategies in the nested subformulas. However note that,
as mentioned in [Sch10a], it seems very unnatural to allow players to use
knowledge which is not available to them for the identification, but not the
implementation of a strategy. These issues also have been discussed in vari-
ous papers on epistemic strategic logics, see for example [JvdH04].
5.3 Anonymous Broadcast
A classic example for anonymous broadcast is the dining cryptographers
problem: A group of at least 3 cryptographers have dinner, and discover
that someone has paid for it. They want to find out whether it was one of
them or an outside party. However in the former case the identity of the
payer should not be revealed.
To achieve this, every pair of adjacent cryptographers first agrees on a
random bit, then everyone announces the exclusive-or of the two random bits
shared with his neighbors and his own secret bit (which is 1 if he payed for
11To cover the version of abuse-freeness discussed here, one would consider strategy
choices for the adversary where the choice of strategy can be performed with full infor-
mation, i.e., information degree 1, while the strategies themselves have to be uniform for
information degree 2 or 3—the definition in [KKW06] uses what is information degree 2 in
our terminology, which is appropriate there since there are no relevant strategic decisions
by the adversary that depend on the content of ciphertexts that the adversary cannot
decrypt in their situations. In a more general setting, limiting the cryptographic abilities
of the adversary, and thus requiring information degree 3 may be more appropriate.
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the dinner). The exclusive-or of all publically revealed bits is exactly the
disjunction of the secret bits.
We treat the problem as follows: For each cryptographer we introduce a
role following the mentioned protocol. An additional party nondeterministi-
cally distributes the private bits, where at most one of the bits is 1. At the
end of the protocol every cryptographer knows the disjunction of the bits,
but does not know, for any strict subset of the remaining cryptographers,
that one of their bits is 1 (obviously if the disjunction is 0 everyone knows
that all inputs are 0). This allows anonymous broadcast of a single bit, gen-
eralizations allow multiple messages and senders [Cha88]. In addition to an
analysis of correctness and anonymity properties similarly as [ABvdM10],
our model also covers the case of active adversaries. A detailed treatment is
out of the scope of this paper.
6 Proof of the Main Result
In this section, we prove the main result, Theorem 4.1. In many of the
following definitions, we omit the protocol Pr, the term signature Σt, and
the equational theory E from the notation—this will always be clear from
the context. For the decidability proof, it is convenient to make the follow-
ing assumptions about the protocol Pr, which can be made without loss of
generality:
– in every protocol role, every path from the root of the role to every
occurrence of the special state Finished has the same length, also called
the length of the protocol rule,
– in a protocol, every role has the same length, also called the length of
the protocol.
Both of these conditions can easily be satisfied by introducing appropri-
ate dummy states and transitions to the protocol roles and replacing in the
QAPI-formulas, variables for original final states with disjunctions including
the relevant added dummy states.
6.1 Bisimulations
Although the main idea of the reason for decidability is simple—since princi-
pals perform operations that consider incoming terms to a “bounded depth”
only and hence the adversary does not gain anything from sending arbitrar-
ily complicated terms to principals, we can consider a restricted structure
with a maximal depth for adversary-constructed terms—the formalization of
30
this idea requires some technical details. The intuitive argument is enough
to prove decidability for reachability properties, however we also prove that
strategic and epistemic properties are maintained under the above-mentioned
simplification of the protocol structure, i.e., we show that truth of every
QAPI-formula is maintained.
A usual tool for showing invariance of properties expressible by a certain
class of formulas is to establish bisimulations between structures, and this
is the tool that we will apply to prove our result: We show that there is a
finite structure which is bisimilar to CPr, and that this finite structure can
be algorithmically constructed. Since QAPI-model checking is decidable for
finite structures, our decidability result then follows (note however that our
proof does not establish that the upper complexity bounds from [Sch10a]
hold for protocol analysis, since the size of the finite structure we construct
is not polynomial in the size of the protocol).
We give the following definition of a bisimulation from [Sch10a] (see also
[Sch10b]) In the following, when Z is a binary relation on state sets, then for
a state q, we write Z(q) to denote the set {q′ | (q, q′) ∈ Z}.
Definition Let C1 and C2 be CGSs with state sets Q1 and Q2, the same
set of players, the same set of propositional variables, and n degrees of in-
formation. Then a relation Z ⊆ Q1 × Q2 is a probabilistic uniform strong
alternating simulation for a coalition A from C1 to C2 if for all (q1, q2) ∈ Z,
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and all players a ∈ A, there is a function ∆1→2(i,a,q1,q2) such
that for all A′ ⊆ A we have
– propositional equivalence: q1 and q2 satisfy the same propositional vari-
ables,
– for all (A′, q1)-moves c1, the (A
′, q2)-move c2 with c2(a) =
∆1→2(i,a,q1,q2)(c1(a)) has the
1. Forward Move Property: for each (A′, q1)-move c
A′
1 , there is a
(A′, q2)-move c
A′
2 such that for all q
′
1 ∈ Q1, we have
Pr
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δ(q2, c2 ∪ cA
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2. Backward Move Property: for each (A′, q2)-move c
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– Knowledge Transfer: if q′1 ∼eq1i (A′) q1, then there is some q
′
2 ∈ Q2 such





– Uniqueness: For all q2 ∈ Q2, there is exactly one q1 ∈ Q1 with (q1, q2) ∈
Z (i.e., Z−1 : Q2 → Q1 is a function).
If we have probabilistic uniform strong alternating simulations in both
directions, and the two simulations agree on the related states in a certain
manner, we have a bisimulation:
Definition Let C1 and C2 be concurrent game structures. Then a proba-
bilistic bisimulation for a coalition A between C1 and C2 is a pair of relations
(Z1, Z2) such that
– Z1 is a probabilistic strategy simulation for A from C1 to C2,
– Z2 is a probabilistic strategy simulation for A from C2 to C1,
– Z−11 ◦ Z−12 and Z−12 ◦ Z−11 are idempotent.
Bisimulations ensure that the related structures satisfy exactly the same
formulas:
Theorem 6.1 ([Sch10a]) Let C1 and C2 be concurrent game structures, let
A be a set of coalitions such that (Z1, Z2) is a probabilistic bisimulation for
every A ∈ A between C1 and C2, let q1 be a state of C1, let q2 be a state of
C2 such that (q1, q2) ∈ Z1 and (q2, q1) ∈ Z2. Let ϕ be a quantified strategy
formula for C1 (and thus for C2) such that every coalition appearing in ϕ is
an element of A. Then C1, q1 |= ϕ if and only if C2, q2 |= ϕ.
This theorem is the key ingredient for our decidability proof: As men-
tioned above, it will establish that there is a finite structure—later called
CPr/≡fin—and a probabilistic bisimulation between this one and CPr. The
construction of CPr/≡fin follows the above intuition: Essentially we disallow
the adversary from sending terms exceeding a certain maximal depth to hon-
est principals, and additionally restrict the adversary to using only finitely
many different nonces. The latter restriction can be made without loss of
generality if the size and number of the terms is finitely bounded. This results
in the finite structure CPr/≡fin.
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Hence our main result, Theorem 4.1 immediately follows from the de-
cidability result for model checking a finite structure and a QAPI-formula
proven in [Sch10a] and the following Theorem:
Theorem 6.2 There is an algorithm which, on input Pr, computes a finite
concurrent game structure CPr/≡fin such that there is a relation Z which is a
probabilistic bisimulation between CPr and CPr/≡fin for every coalition, and the
initial states of CPr and CPr/≡fin are identical.
6.2 Some notation
For proving the main result, we introduce some additional notation. A lot of
the objects introduced here and in the remainder of Section 6 depend on the
protocol Pr, however in order to increase readability we do not make this
dependence explicit in the notation—the protocol will always be clear from
the context.
Definition Let Pr be a protocol over the term signature Σt with equational
theory E, let q be a state in CPr. Then
– ar(Σt) is the maximal arity of a symbol in Σt,
– depth (E) is the maximal depth of a term appearing as the left- or
righthand-side of an equation in E,
– dPr is the product of the maximal depth of a term appearing in one of
the descriptions of the protocol roles and depth (E),
– if q is not an initial state, then pred(q) denotes the unique predecessor
state of q in CPr,
– prvst(q) denotes the number of steps needed to reach q in a proto-
col run, i.e., if q is an initial state then prvst(q) = 0, and otherwise
prvst(q) = prvst(pred(q)) + 1.
6.3 Defining State-equivalence
We introduce some notation that allows us to succinctly refer to certain
elements and subterms of larger terms. In the following, we regard terms as
trees in the natural way.
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Definition Let t = (t1, . . . , tn) be a sequence of terms over the signature
Σt, let u be a term over Σt, and let path be a path (i.e., a sequence of natural
numbers bounded by ar(Σt)), let i be a natural number, and let p = (i, path),
then
– p is a position,
– u ↓ path is the subterm of u whose root is the vertex reached when
following the path path starting in the root of u. If this path uses
non-existing successors in u, then u ↓ path = error (where error is a
special symbol not used anywhere else),
– u(path) is the label of the root node of u ↓ path (where the label of
error is error),
– |t| = n,
– if path2 is a path, then p◦path2 is defined as the position (i, path1path2)
(in this case we say that p ◦ path2 is a suffix of p, and p is a prefix of
p ◦ path2),
– t↓p = ti ↓path and t(p) = ti(path) (both of these are error if i > n)
– depth (p) is the length of path.
The following defines a natural notion of equivalence of term sequences:
For a natural number d, ∼d-equivalence requires that two sequences “look
the same” when we only consider elements and subterms appearing down
to depth d: The elements in these positions must be the same, and equality
between positions must hold in one sequence if and only if it holds in the other
(note however that the equality of the subterms must hold down to the leaves
in the trees, notwithstanding the depth). We will later use this definition to
define a similar equivalence on states of a cryptographic protocol: These are
“equivalent,” if the honest principals are in the same protocol states and the
so-far observed terms are equivalent to a sufficient degree.
Definition Let t1 and t2 be sequences of terms, and let d ∈ N. Then
t1 ∼d t2 (t1 and t2 are d-equivalent), if for every pair of positions p1, p2 with
depth (p1) , depth (p2) ≤ d, we have
– t1(p1) = t
2(p2), and
– t1 ↓p1 = t1 ↓p2 if and only if t2 ↓p1 = t2 ↓p2.
Note that it t1 ∼d t2 for some d ≥ 0, then |t1| = |t2| (this follows due to
the equality of elements on the first level, and the fact that such an element
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is error if and only if the referenced term does not exist, i.e., |t| ≥ n if and
only if t((n, ε)) 6= error).
Definition Let Pr be a k-roles protocol, and let q be a state of CPr, then
terms(q) is the sequence containing all terms from the sequences M1, M2,
. . . , Mk, and MA. For a position p, with q ↓ p we denote terms(q) ↓ p, and
with q(p) we denote terms(q)(p).
Hence terms(q) contains the set of all terms sent, received, and parsed
by the adversary and principals. Equivalence of states is now defined in the
natural way:
Definition Let Pr be a protocol, let q1, q2 be states in CPr, and let
d ∈ N. Then q1 ∼d q2 (q1 and q2 are d-equivalent), if all honest principals
are in the same local state, the same set of identities is corrupted, and
terms(q1) ∼d terms(q2).
Note that this definition of equivalence does not refer to the indistin-
guishability relations of the principals: If q1 ∼d q2, then there may very well
be tests that a principal can perform to distinguish these states. However,
the tests that occur in the protocol description will yield the same result in
states that are equivalent to a “sufficient” degree (see later), so that the avail-
able choices for the principal are the same. This is the key property of this
construction: We use the above equivalence of states to show that if q1 ∼d q2
for a sufficiently large d, then both the adversary and the honest principals
have exactly the same strategic options in q1 and q2, even if these options
take into account the (possible different) knowledge in the states q1 and q2.
In order to make this precise, we now define the level of ∼d-equivalence we
require after each number of protocol steps, this is done with the function
eqdeg (.). More precisely, the purpose of this function is the following: If
q1 and q2 are states such that all honest principals are in the same local
state in q1 and q2 (and thus in particular prvst(q1) = prvst(q2) =: s) then
d := eqdeg (s) has the property that if q1 ∼d q2, then q1 and q2 are “strategi-
cally equivalent” (proving this is the main work required to show our result).
Our definition of the probabilistic bisimulation will be based on this idea:
States are Z-related if the local states of the principals are identical, and
equivalence of terms holds down to the specified degree. To see that this
degree depends on the state, observe that when the protocol run is over,
we are not interested in the terms at all anymore, but only need to require
that principals have reached the same local protocol state. In previous states
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however, the question which sub-terms of incoming messages for principals
are identical to previously-received messages is very relevant, as the question
which tests (performed by honest principals) are satisfied in the state clearly
depends on this.
Proposition 6.3 Let q1 and q2 be states in CPr such that q1 ∼0 q2. Then
prvst(q1) = prvst(q2).
Proof. By definition of equivalence, all principals are in the same local state
in q1 and q2. The number of steps performed in the protocol run is the
same as the number of steps performed by any principal (since our model is
concurrent). Hence the claim follows. 
We can now formally define the function eqdeg (.) as explained above:
Definition For a k-protocol Pr with length ` and a number d, let





– mdagdpthA(d) = 2
#e · (d+ 1),
– let eqdeg (0) = ` · dPr,
– for d ≥ 1, let eqdeg (d+ 1) = 2d+ 2mdagdpthA(d) + dPr.
– for a state q, let eqdeg (q) = eqdeg (`− prvst(q)).
– for two states q1 and q2 of CPr with prvst(q1) = prvst(q2), let q1 ≡ q2 if
1. q1 ∼eqdeg(q1) q2, and
2. either q1 and q2 both are initial states, or pred(q1) ≡ pred(q2)
The condition that if q1 ≡ q2, then pred(q1) ≡ pred(q2) implies that if
two states are equivalent, then their histories are equivalent as well.
6.4 Move Transfer For Honest Principals
We now show that honest principals have essentially “the same options” in
CPr/≡ as they have in CPr, i.e., essentially we show the forward move property
for honest principals. The main work needed to be done here is to prove
that the effects of actions performed by honest principals are limited to a
certain depth in the resulting protocol state. This is intuitively clear, since
the operations of honest principals only use terms with bounded depth—
hence both modifications performed and analysis carried out by principals
only concern parts of the message down to some bounded depth.
The following lemma shows that when constructing new terms from a
term sequence using terms constructed from Σt, the resulting term contains
only references of limited depth into the original term sequence.
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Lemma 6.4 Let M be a sequence of messages, let t be a term, and let
r = t[x/M]. Then there are a term s and positions q1, . . . , qn such that for
all relevant i,
1. depth (qi) ≤ depth (E) · depth (t) =: d,
2. r = s[x1/M↓q1, . . . , xn/M↓qn],
3. depth (s) ≤ depth (t).
In addition, the term s only depends on t and on the entries of M of depth
at most d.
Proof. This lemma trivially follows from the observation that when evaluat-
ing the term t[x/M], each application of a rule from the equational theory
E only results in a reference with depth depth (E) intoM. Hence the term s
is obtained from t by replacing an operator that results in a reference to M
with a variable, and the position corresponding to the variable is simply the
position of the referenced term. Since the nesting degree of these applications
is restricted by the maximal depth of the term t, and due to the above, each
application only results in an increase of the depth of reference by depth (E),
the result follows. 
We now show that ≡-equivalence is maintained under adding specific
terms—the following lemma describes the situation where principals perform
their protocol rules and send out the corresponding terms. In the later appli-
cation of the lemma,M1 andM2 will be the sequences of messages received
by principals (including the adversary) in states q1 and q2 with q1 ≡ q2, and
M′1 and M′2 will be the messages received in the states q′1 and q′2 obtained
from q1 and q2 by letting the honest principals perform the same move in both
steps. The terms mi are the ones from the send sequence of our protocols,
and are used to construct messages sent by honest principals. The second
application of the lemma is when principals build new messages not to send
to other principals, but to perform the tests as part of their pasring sequence.
The move of the adversary will be covered in the following Section 6.5.
Lemma 6.5 Let M1 and M2 be term sequences, let m1, . . . , mm be terms.
Further, let d1, d2, and d3 be natural numbers such that
– for all i, we have that depth (mi) ≤ d3 and depth (mi) · depth (E) ≤ d2,
– M1 ∼d1 M2.
For a ∈ {1, 2}, let M′a be obtained from Ma by adding the terms m1[x/Ma],
. . . , mk[x/Ma]. Then M′1 ∼dM′2, where d = d1 − d2 − d3.
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In a protocol run, Lemma 6.5 covers the result of actions performed by
honest principals: The messages sent by honest principals are obtained by
constructing new terms, which may reference elements of the sequence of
previously received messages. Due to Lemma 6.4, we know that the depth
of reference into previously-received terms is limited by a constant that only
depends on the protocol and the equational theory E. This lemma essentially
shows that if two states are “sufficiently” equivalent, and the principals then
perform the same moves (which they can do, due to Proposition 6.6, see
below), then the resulting states are equivalent (to a slightly lesser degree).
This fact will be an ingredient in the proof of the forward- and backward
move properties required by the bisimulation. We now prove the lemma.
Proof. Due to Lemma 6.4, there are terms s1, . . . , sm and positions
q1, . . . , qn such that the depth of each qi is at most depth (E) ·
max {depth (tj) | 1 ≤ j ≤ m} ≤ d2, the depth of each si is at most
depth (ti) ≤ d3, andM′a is obtained fromMa by adding the terms s1[x1/M↓
q1, . . . , xn/M↓qn], . . . , sm[x1/M↓q1, . . . , xn/M↓qn].
For a ∈ {1, 2}, let Ma = (ta1, . . . , ta|Ma|). We denote mi[x/Ma] with s
a
i
for a ∈ {1, 2} and i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
We can without loss of generality assume that among the positions qi,
for each j ≤ |M1| (which must be identical to |M2|), there is a position of
the form (j, ε). If these are not present, we add these positions and prove
the claim for this extended set of positions (note that these positions have
depth 0). Similarly, we can assume that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is
some term sji which is the variable xi. Again, if these are not present we
add them (noting again that all these terms have depth 0). Since we now
have terms sji such that s
a
ji
= tai for all relevant i, it suffices to prove that
u1 = (s11, . . . , s
1
m) and u
2 = (s21, . . . , s
2
m) are (d1 − d2 − d3)-equivalent (since
the original terms from the sequences M1 and M2 appear in this list, this
implies the claim of the lemma).
Hence let p1 and p2 be positions, where for b ∈ {1, 2}, we have pb =
(ib, pathb), and |pathb| ≤ d1 − d2 − d3. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that ib = b.
We first show that u1(p1) = u
2(p1) (note that in this proof, we only use
the fact that depth (p1) ≤ d1−d2—we will refer to this slightly stronger result
in the second part of the proof). By construction, (since p1 = (1, path1)), we
have ua(p1) = s
a
1(path1). If path1 does not visit a position in s1 which is a
variable, then obviously sa1(path1) = s1(path1), and it follows that u
1(p1) =
s11(path1) = s1(path1) = s
2
1(path1) = u
2(p1) as required. Now assume that
when following path1 in s1, we encounter a variable, without loss of generality
the variable x1. Let path1 = w1w2, such that s1(w1) = x1. It then follows that
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1 ↓ w1)(w2) = x1[x1/(ua ↓
q1), . . . ](w2) = (u
a ↓ q1)(w2) = ua(q1 ◦ w2) = ta1(qpath1w2). Since |w2| ≤
depth (p1) ≤ d1−d2, and depth (q1) ≤ d2, it follows that depth (q1)+|w2| ≤ d1.
Hence we know (since t1 ∼d1 t2, that u1(q1 ◦ w2) = u2(q1 ◦ w2), and it follows
that u1(p1) = u
1(q1 ◦ w2) = u2(q1 ◦ w2) = u2(p1), as required.
We now show that u1 ↓ p1 = u1 ↓ p2 if and only if u2 ↓ p1 = u2 ↓ p2. Due
to symmetry, it obviously suffices to prove one direction. Hence assume that
u1 ↓p1 = u1 ↓p2. We show the claim by induction over the depth restrictions
for the pb, the qi, and the si. In the following, for α, γ ∈ N, we say that
the pair (α, γ) holds, if the following implication is true: For all positions
p1, p2, and terms s1, s2, if depth (pb) ≤ α for b ∈ {1, 2} and depth (sb) ≤ γ
for b ∈ {0, 1}, then u1 ↓ p1 = u1 ↓ p2 implies u2 ↓ p1 = u2 ↓ p2. To prove the
lemma, we need to show that (α, γ) holds for all values with α+ γ ≤ d1− d2
(the claim of the lemma involves only positions p1, p2 with depth at most
d1 − d2 − d3, and terms si with depth (si) ≤ d3).
For the base of the induction, we show that (d1−d2, 0) holds. In this case,
the terms s1 and s2 have depth 0, i.e., they are variables or constants (where
we treat the empty term ε as a constant), and depth (pb) ≤ d2 for b = 1, 2.
We can without loss of generality assume that if sb is a variable, then it is the
variable xb, and if sb is a constant, then it is the constant consb. Thus only
the variables x1 and x2, and only the positions q1 and q2 are relevant among
the qi. Again, without loss of generality, we assume that qb = (b, qpathb).
Now if sb is the variable xb, then we have (for a ∈ {1, 2}):
ua ↓pb = sab ↓pathb
= (xb[. . . , xb/(t
a ↓qb) . . . ])↓pathb
= (ta ↓qb)↓pathb
= (ta ↓(b, qpathb))↓pathb
= (tab ↓qpathb)↓pathb
= tab ↓(qpathb ◦ pathb).
If sb is the constant consb, then we have (for a ∈ {1, 2}): ua ↓ pb = sab ↓
pathb = consb ↓pathb. We now make a case distinction.
Assume that both s1 and s2 are variables, i.e., s1 = x1, and s2 = x2.
Then t11 ↓ (qpath1 ◦ path1) = u1 ↓ p1 = u1 ↓ p2 = t12 ↓ (qpath2 ◦ path2).
Since |qpathb| + |pathb| ≤ d2 + d1 − d + 2 = d1, and t1 ∼d1 t2, this implies
t21 ↓ (qpath1 ◦ path1) = t22 ↓ (qpath2 ◦ path2). Due to the above (and since
both sb are variables), we therefore have u
2 ↓p1 = t21 ↓ (qpath1 ◦ path1) = t22 ↓
(qpath2 ◦ path2) = u2 ↓p2, as required.
Assume that both s1 and s2 are constants, i.e., s1 = cons1, and s2 = cons2.
Then cons1 ↓path1 = u1 ↓ p1 = u1 ↓ p2 = cons2 ↓path2. Hence it follows that
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u2 ↓p1 = cons1 ↓path1 = cons2 ↓path2 = u2 ↓path2 as required. (Considering
“subterms” of constants here only serves as a unified means to cover the cases
where the path is empty (and thus the term is “legal”) or not (in which the
term is the error-symbol.))
Assume that one is a variable, the other a constant, without loss of gen-
erality, s1 is the variable x1, and s2 the constant cons2. From the above, we
thus know that t11 ↓ (qpath1 ◦ path1) = u1 ↓p1 = u1 ↓p2 = cons2 ↓path2. Since
t1 ∼d1 t2, and |qpath1 ◦ path1| ≤ d1, we know that t21((qpath1 ◦ path1)) =
t11((qpath1 ◦ path1)) = cons2(path2). Note that this “subterm” is either
the constant cons2 or the error-symbol. Since each term in the t
a is a
well-constructed term over Σt, the occurrence of cons2 in t
2
1 cannot have
a successor, thus equality of elements here implies equality as subterms,
hence we have t21 ↓ (qpath1 ◦ path1) = cons2 ↓ path2. Hence it follows that
u2 ↓ p1 = t21 ↓ (qpath1 ◦ path1) = cons2 ↓ path2 = u2 ↓ p2, as required. This
covers all possible cases, and thus completes the proof of the base of the
claim that (d1 − d2, 0) holds.
Now assume inductively that (α, γ) is true, where α ≥ 1. We show that
(α− 1, γ + 1) is true. Since we know from the above that (d1 − d2, 0) holds,
this completes the proof of (α, γ) for all α + γ ≤ d1 − d2: Hence assume
that s1 and s2 are terms with depth (s1) , depth (s2) ≤ γ+1, and assume that
depth (p1) , depth (p2) ≤ α − 1. Without loss of generality, we can assume
that depth (s1) ≥ depth (s2), and hence in particular, depth (s1) > 0 (since
the case where both depths are 0 is obviously covered by (α, γ). Hence,
s1 = f(s
′
1, . . . , s
′
e) for an e-ary function symbol f from the signature Σ
t.
Obviously, depth (s′i) < depth (s1). We consider several cases.
Assume that depth (s1) > depth (s2), and path1 6= ε, then path1 = c◦path ′1
for some c ∈ {1, . . . , e} (the case if c > e, i.e., the position leads to an
error-symbol, is covered by part 1 of the proof, since then in all relevant
positions, the error-symbol appears). It follows that for a ∈ {1, 2}, we have
ua ↓ p1 = sa1 ↓ path1 = s′ac ↓ path ′1 (here, s′ai for some i is defined analogously
to sai , where an occurrence of a variable xj is replaced with t
a ↓ qj). Since
u1 ↓p1 = u1 ↓p2, we have that s′1c ↓path ′1 = u1 ↓p2
These positions can be described using terms s′c, s2, where the depth of
each is at most γ, and paths path ′1, path2, where |path ′1| , |path2| ≤ α−1 ≤ α.
Since (α, γ) holds, we know that the above equality implies s′2c ↓path ′1 = u2 ↓
p2, and due to the above this is equivalent to u
2 ↓p1 = u2 ↓p2, as required.
Assume that depth (s1) > depth (s2), and path1 = ε, then u





1 , . . . , s
′a
e ). Since u
1 ↓ p1 = u1 ↓ p2, we know that u1(p2) =
u1(p1) = f , and from part 1 of the proof we have that u
2(p2) = u
1(p2) = f .
We further know that for all steps c, we have u1 ↓(p1 ◦ c) = u2 ↓(p2 ◦ c).
Due to the above, we know that u2 ↓p1 = s21, hence we know that u2(p1) =
40
f = u2(p2). To prove that u
2 ↓ p1 = u2 ↓ p2, it thus remains to show that
for all steps c, we have u2 ↓ (p1 ◦ c) = u2 ↓ (p2 ◦ c). From the above, it
follows that ua ↓ (p1 ◦ c) = (ua ↓ p1) ↓ c = sa1 ↓ c = s′ac . Hence the involved
positions in ua can be described with terms s′c and s2, where the depth of
these is ≤ γ, and positions p′1, p′2 with depth ≤ α (instead of p1 and p2, where
depth (p1) , depth (p2) ≤ α − 1, we consider a position p′1 with depth 0, and
a position p2 ◦ c, with depth one more that p2). Since we know that (α, γ)
holds, the fact that equality for the involved positions holds in u1 transfers
to equality in u2, as required.
Assume that depth (s1) = depth (s2) = γ + 1, in this case we have sb =
fb(sb,1, . . . , sb,eb), where fb is an eb-ary constructor from Σ
t, and sb,i are terms
with depth (sb,i) ≤ γ. Analogously to the sab , for a, b ∈ {1, 2}, and i ≤ eb,
we define sab,i to be the term obtained from sb,i by replacing every occurrence
of a variable xj with the term u
a ↓ qj. Now observe that if pathb = ε, then
ua ↓ pb = sab ↓ ε = sab , and for a step c, we have that ua ↓ (pb ◦ c) = (ua ↓ pb) ↓
c = sab ↓c = sab,c.
Analogously, if pathb = cbpath
′
b, then u




b ↓ cb) ↓
path ′b = s
a
b,cb
↓ path ′b, and for a step c, we have that ua ↓ (pb ◦ c) = (ua ↓ pb) ↓
c = (sab,cb ↓path
′
b)↓c = sab,cb ↓(path
′
b ◦ c).
Assume that depth (s1) = depth (s2) = γ+1 and path1 = path2 = ε. Since
u1 ↓ p1 = u1 ↓ p2, due to the above we have that f1 = u1(p1) = u1(p2) = f2,
and hence e1 = e2 (which we will denote with e). From part 1 of the proof,
we know that u2(p1) = u
1(p1) = f1, and analogously u
2(p2) = u
1(p2) = f1.
Hence it remains to show that for all c ∈ {1, . . . , e}, we have that u2 ↓
(p1 ◦ c) = u2 ↓ (p2 ◦ c) (where we know that these equalities hold in u1).
From the above, and since path1 = path2 = ε, we know that u
a ↓ (pb ◦ c) =





depth (s′1) , depth (s
′
2) ≤ γ, and positions p′1, p′2 with depth (p′1) , depth (p′2) =
0 ≤ α. Since subterm-equality for the corresponding positions holds in u1,
and we know that (α, γ) holds, equality also holds in u2 as required.
Assume that depth (s1) = depth (s2) = γ + 1, one pathb is empty, the
other is not. Without loss of generality, assume that path1 = ε, and path2 =
c2path
′
2. Then we know that u
a(p1) = s
a
1(ε) = f1. Since u
1 ↓ p1 = u1 ↓ p2,
it follows that u1(p2) = u
1(p1) = f1, and thus (due to part 1 of the proof),
we have u2(pb) = u
1(pb) = f1 for b = 1, 2. It remains to show that for
all c ∈ {1, . . . , e1}, we have u2 ↓ (p1 ◦ c) = u2 ↓ (p2 ◦ c) (where we again
know that this equality is true in u1). Due to the above, we know that
ua ↓ (p1 ◦ c) = sa1,c, and ua ↓ p2 ◦ c = sa2,c2 ↓ (path
′
2 ◦ c). Hence the involved
positions can be described with terms s1,c and s2,c2 , which have depth ≤ γ,
and positions (1, c) and (2, path ′2c), which have depth 1 ≤ α and α − 1 ≤ α
(note α ≥ 1).
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Since subterm-equality for the corresponding positions holds in u1, and
we know that (α, γ) holds, equality also holds in u2 as required.
Assume that depth (s1) = depth (s2) = γ+1, path1 = c1path
′
1, and path2 =
c2path
′
2, then due to the above we have that u
a ↓ pb = sab,cb ↓ path
′
b. Hence
the involved positions can be described with terms s1,c1 and s2,c2 with depth
at most γ, and positions p′1 and p
′
2 with depth (p
′
b) = depth (pb) − 1 ≤ α.
Again, we know from induction that (α, γ) holds, and thus equality for the
positions in u1 implies the corresponding equality in u2. This completes the
case distinction and therefore the proof. 
To establish the move transfer functions for honest principals, the follow-
ing proposition is the key in this construction. It states that in “equivalent”
states, principals have the same moves available.
Proposition 6.6 Let Pr be a protocol, and let q1, q2 be states in CPr such
that q1 ≡ q2. Then for an honest principal a ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we have that
∆(q1, a) = ∆(q2, a).
Proof. The result directly follows from Lemma 6.4: By definition of dPr,
the application of a test used in a protocol rule only accesses and compares
elements with depth at most dPr. Hence, the terms compared by the test
are identical in q1 iff they are in q2 due to the above Lemma. Note that
the proposition trivially holds in final states of the protocol as here honest
principals only have dummy moves available. 
6.5 Move Transfer for the Adversary
We now show the analogous result of Section 6.4 for the adversary: If q1 ≡ q2,
then every move of the adversary in q1 can be transformed into one in q2 such
that the application of these moves again leads to a pair of equivalent states
(provided that the honest principals perform the same moves in q1 and q2,
as they can due to Proposition 6.6).
The situation for adversary moves is more complicated than for princi-
pal moves for several reasons: Adversary moves may be terms of arbitrary
complexity, which can reference terms appearing in arbitrary depth in the
states q1 or q2. When transferring an adversary move from one state to the
other, we have to carefully ensure that up to the required depth, the same
equalities hold in both resulting states. Since the adversary cannot send ar-
bitrary terms, but only those which result from applications of A-terms to
the messages he received previously during the protocol run, we start with
an analysis of the structure of adversary-constructable terms.
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In the following, the extraction-depth of a term t with a variable x is
the maximal depth of references into the term substituted for x, i.e., the
maximal (over all paths in t) sum of, for each operator appearing in the
path, the maximal depth of an equations mentioning the operator in the
equational theory E
Definition Let q be a state of CPr, and let p be a position. We say that p
is A-accessible in q if
– depth (p) ≤ dPr · prvst(q),
– there is an A-term tA with extraction-depth at most dPr such that for
all states q′ obtained from q by replacing q ↓ p with a new term t′, we
have that tA[x/terms(q
′)] = t′.
Intuitively, the last point of the above definition expresses that for the
adversary, there is a “way to extract the subterm at position p from the state
q.” However, since the subterm at p may appear in more than one position,
the technical definition has to make sure that the “extraction” performed by
the adversary-term t gives the term at position p, no matter what the term
actually is. Note that the restriction on the extraction-depth of tA does not
follow from the fact that depth (p) ≤ dPr: The term tA might need to access
elements in deeper positions that allow him to gain access to the term in
position p (as an example, this might be nonces used as symmetric keys).
Obviously, A-accessibility of a position is invariant under state-
equivalence, as long as equivalence holds up to a sufficient degree—this fol-
lows trivially from the definition:
Proposition 6.7 Let q1 and q2 be states in CPr, such that q1 ≡ q2. Then a
position p is A-accessible in q1 if and only if it is A-accessible in q2.
Proof. This follows since for any state q, we have that eqdeg (q) ≥ dPr ·
prvst(q): By definition, this is true for final states of the protocol, and also
from the definition it follows that for any non-initial state q′, we have that
eqdeg (pred(q′)) ≥ eqdeg (q′), while obviously prvst(q′) > prvst(pred(q′)). 
In the following, for a state q, we denote with dA(q) the set of messages
that the adversary can construct in the state q, i.e., the set of terms of the
form t[x/MA], where t is a term from TA andMA again denotes the sequence
of messages received by the adversary so far in the protocol run.
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The following proposition states that terms t that the adversary can ex-
tract from the current state, and that cannot be constructed from the ad-
versary himself have to be present in a position that is A-accessible to the
adversary. The technical requirement for t in the proposition expresses that
the outmost operation of the term t has not been computed by the adver-
sary, but by an honest principal. As an example, this may be an encryption
performed by a principal (where the adversary does not know both the nonce
used for randomization and the plaintext), or a signature of a principal where
the adversary does not have the secret signature key. Intuitively, this is clear,
as the results of computations of honest principals appear with limited depth
in the state where the computation was first performed, and while it is possi-
ble for the adversary to “copy” a term containing the subterm in question to
a position with higher depth, this does not help him accessing the subterm:
For example, a principal will never decrypt a ciphertext contained so deeply
in an adversary-sent term such that the normal protocol rules will never even
access that position.
Proposition 6.8 Let q be a state in CPr, and let t ∈ dA(q) be a term not of
the form tA[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn] for a term tA ∈ TA with depth 1, and t1, . . . , tn ∈
dA(q). Then there is a position p such that p is A-accessible in q, and q ↓
p = t.
Proof. By choice of t, the term was constructed by a principal. Consider the
first state q′ in the protocol run leading up to q in which the adversary can
construct t, let q′′ be the direct predecessor of q′ (without loss of generality, we
can assume that q′ is not an initial state of the protocol). If t does not appear
as a subterm in q′′, the claim follows, since then t is computed by a principal
in the step from q′′ to q′, and results from principal computations appear
with depth at most dPr. Additionally, since the adversary can construct t in
q′, this position must be A-accessible.
Hence assume that t appears as a subterm of q′′, and that no new copy
of the term is generated in the transition from q′′ to q′ in an A-accessiple
position (if this were true, the above case would apply). Since the adversary
cannot extract t in q′′, a partial extraction must have been performed by a
principal, i.e., an honest principal constructed a message using an extraction
referring into the superterm of t. Between the root of the extracted superterm
and the appearance of t itself, no adversary-computed subterm can appear,
since gaining access to such a term would not help the adversary in extracting
t (this term was constructable by the adversary in q′′ already).
The path from the root of the extracted subterm to the root of t therefore
contains only of principal-performed computations, and thus is restricted
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in depth by dPr · prvst(q′′). The result of the extraction appears in q′ at
depth of at most dPr. Hence t appears in a position with depth at most
dPr · prvst(q′′) + dPr = dPr · prvst(q′) ≤ dPr · prvst(q). This inequality is true
since prvst(q′) = prvst(q′′) + 1, as q′ is a direct successor of q′′, and since q is
a (not necessarily direct) successor of q′, it follows that prvst(q′) ≤ prvst(q).
Note that the above argument also inductively covers the case when the
term uses more than one extraction (for example when accessing a symmet-
ric key which is then used to decrypt another message): These extractions
appear in parallel and do not refer to the same position. In the example, if a
key appears at a certain depth, this depth does not add to the depth of the
decrypted message. Formally, the extraction depth of the resulting term is
still bounded by dPr if every single extraction is. 
The following lemma now establishes “Move Transfer” for the adversary:
When two states are equivalent, an adversary move from one can be “trans-
formed” into a move for the other, such that the follow-up states are equiv-
alent, provided that honest principals perform the same moves, as they can
due to Proposition 6.6. In the following lemma, note that every possible
choice of q′ leads to the same number d′.
Lemma 6.9 Let q1 and q2 be non-final states in CPr, such that q1 ≡ q2. Let
d′ = eqdeg (q′), where q′ is a successor state of q1 or q2. Then for every
adversary move m1A in q
1, there exists an adversary move m2A in q
2 such that
terms(q1) ◦m1A[x/M1A] ∼d′ terms(q2) ◦m2A[x/M2A]
(whereM1A andM2A are the sequences of messages received by the adversary
in q1 and q2). The resulting move transfer function can be constructed such
that move uniformity for information degrees 1, 2, and 3 is satisfied.
Proof. Note that by definition of ∼d, the same set of identities C is corrupted
in q1 and q2. With d, we denote eqdeg (q
1) = eqdeg (q2). From the definition
of ≡ and eqdeg (.), it follows that 2d′ + 2mdagdpthA(d′) ≤ d.
Let m1 = [[m1A[x/M1A]]] be the resulting message sequence sent by the
adversary, and let ti denote the terms in that sequence, i.e., m
1 = (t1, . . . , tk).
We construct a directed acyclic graph m1DAG with root root having k outgoing
edges leading to trees representing the terms t1, . . . , tk. For a position p =
(i, path), with m1DAG → p we denote the vertex in m1DAG obtained when
following the path i ◦ path from root , and with m1DAG ↓ p, we denote the
subterm represented by mDAG → p (where the subterm represented by a
vertex is interpreted in the canonical way). We use the same notation for
the other DAGs appearing in the remainder of the proof. It follows that
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m1 ↓ p = m1DAG ↓ p for all positions p. We say that positions p1 and p2 with
depth at most d′ are equivalent (written p1 ∼ p2), if m1 ↓ p1 = m1 ↓ p2. We
modify m1DAG as follows:
For each equivalence class, let p0 be a representative, and for all p′ ∼ p0,
redirect all incoming edges of m1DAG → p′ to m1DAG → p0.
The construction ensures that if p1 ∼ p2, then m1DAG → p1 = m1DAG → p2.
The terms represented by the involved positions remain invariant, i.e., for all
positions p, we have m1 ↓p = m1DAG ↓p. In particular, the resulting graph is
acyclic: A cycle would imply the existence of an infinite subterm that is not
present in m1. For a position p, let dagdepth(p) be the length of a longest
path from root to m1DAG → p (which may be longer than the path induced
by p). From m1DAG, we obtain mDAG as follows:
1. For all positions pDAG, p, r and paths path such that m1DAG ↓ pDAG =
q1 ↓ r, depth (r) ≤ d′, and m1DAG → p = m1DAG → (pDAG ◦ path),
replace the vertex at mDAG → p with a vertex containing the marker
(r → path). Remove all vertices from mDAG that are not reachable from
root anymore.
2. For all positions p with dagdepth(p) > mdagdpthA, if mDAG → p still
exists, insert a new adversary nonce into mDAG → p.
Note that m1DAG → p1 = m1DAG → p2 does not necessarily imply mDAG →
p1 = mDAG → p2 (there might be a prefix p′ of p1 such that mDAG → p′
contains a marker, then mDAG → p1 does not exist, while mDAG → p2 still
does). In particular, the above can “fail” if for a prefix p′ of p, mDAG → p′ has
already been overwritten with a marker. In this case, the “replace” operation
does nothing. Also note that if mDAG → p contains a marker (r → path),
then |path| ≤ dagdepth(p). The construction also implies that if mDAG → p
contains a marker (r → path), then m1 ↓p = q1 ↓ (r ◦ path). We prove a few
features of the construction for later reference.
Fact 1 If p is a position with depth (p) ≤ d′, then dagdepth(p) ≤
mdagdpthA(d
′).
Proof. (of Fact 1) Let dagdepth(p, i) be the dagdepth of p after i redirection
steps. We claim that dagdepth(p, i) ≤ 2i · (d′ + 1), if depth (p) ≤ d′. For
i = 0, this is obvious. Now let p0 be the representative chosen in step i.
Note that on each path in m1DAG, at most one edge is redirected in each step.
Let p be a position with depth (p) ≤ d′ whose dagdepth changes in step i.
Then there is a position p′ with depth (p′) ≤ d′ and a path path such that
m1DAG → (p′ ◦ path) = m1DAG → p after step i − 1, and the set of incoming
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edges of m1DAG → p′ changes in step i (either because p′ is the representative
p0 chosen in step i and thus the vertex gets additional incoming edges, or
the incoming edges of m1DAG → p′ get rerouted in this step). Let path be a
longest path such that m1DAG → (p′ ◦ path) = m1DAG → p before step i. It
follows that |path| ≤ dagdepth(p, i− 1).
After step i, m1DAG → p′ = m1DAG → p0. Since on each path, at most one
edge is redirected in the step i, it follows that path is still the longest path
from p′ to p in m1DAG after step i. Since we assumed that dagdepth(p, i) 6=
dagdepth(p, i − 1), we know that the longest path from root to m1DAG → p
after step i is one visiting p′. Hence dagdepth(p, i) = dagdepth(p′, i) + |path|.
We also know dagdepth(p′, i) = dagdepth(p′′, i− 1), where p′′ is the position
in the equivalence class of p0 with the maximal dagdepth before step i. It
follows that dagdepth(p, i) = dagdepth(p′, i) + |path| = dagdepth(p′′, i− 1) +
|path| ≤ dagdepth(p′′, i − 1) + dagdepth(p, i − 1). Due to induction, since
depth (p′′) , depth (p) ≤ d′, we have dagdepth(p′′, i − 1), dagdepth(p, i − 1) ≤
2i−1 · (d′ + 1), and hence dagdepth(p, i) ≤ 2 · (2i−1 · (d′ + 1)) = 2i · (d′ + 1) as
claimed.
The number of steps in the construction is the number #e of equiva-
lence classes. Since a pair of positions where one is a proper prefix of the
other cannot be equivalent, #e is bounded by the number of positions with
depth at most d′ that are pairwise incomparable with respect to prefix or-
dering. This is the number of leaves in a tree at level d′, where the root
vertex has out-degree k, and the remaining vertices have an out-degree of
at most the maximal arity of an operator from Σt. Hence if depth (p) ≤ d′,
then dagdepth(p) = dagdepth(p,#e) ≤ (2#e) · (d′ + 1), which is exactly the
definition of mdagdpthA(d
′). 
Fact 2 Let p be a position such that mDAG → p contains a marker (r →
path). Then |path| ≤ dagdepth(p) ≤ mdagdpthA(d′).
Proof. (of Fact 2) Since mDAG → p contains the marker (r → path), there is
no prefix p′ of p such that mDAG → p′ contains a marker or a newly introduced
adversary nonce. In particular, this implies dagdepth(p) ≤ mdagdpthA(d′).
Hence due to construction, |path| ≤ dagdepth(p) ≤ mdagdpthA(d′). 
Let m2DAG be the graph obtained from mDAG by replacing every vertex
containing a marker (r → path) with the term q2 ↓ (r ◦ path), and define
m2 = (m2DAG ↓1, . . . ,m2DAG ↓k). In particular, if mDAG → p contains a marker
(r → path), then m2 ↓ p = q2 ↓ (r ◦ path). In our construction, m2 will
be the message sequence actually sent by the adversary as a consequence
of the application of the move m2A. We first show that m
2 satisfies the
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required properties, and then prove that an adversary move m2A resulting in
this message to be sent exists.
Fact 3 Let p be a position such that depth (p) ≤ mdagdpthA(d′). Then
m1(p) = m2(p).
Proof. First assume that there is a minimal prefix pr or p such that mDAG →
pr contains a marker (r → path). Let p = pr ◦w. From Fact 2, it follows that
|path| ≤ mdagdpthA(d′), and from the construction, we know depth (r) ≤ d′.
It therefore follows that ma(p) = (ma ↓ pr)(w) = (qa ↓ (r ◦ path))(w) =
qa(r ◦ path ◦ w). We also know that |w| ≤ depth (p) ≤ mdagdpthA(d′). It
therefore follows that depth (r ◦ path ◦ w) = depth (r) + |path| + |w| ≤ d′ +
mdagdpthA(d
′) + mdagdpthA(d
′) ≤ d, and thus due to d-equivalence of q1
and q2, it follows that m1(p) = q1(r ◦ path ◦ w) = q2(r ◦ path ◦ w) = m2(p)
as required.
Now assume there is no prefix containing a marker. Since dagdepth(p) ≤
mdagdpthA(d
′), there is also no prefix containing a newly introduced adver-
sary nonce, and thus m1(p) = mDAG(p) = m
2(p) as required. 
We now prove s1 := terms(q
1,m1) ∼d′ terms(q2,m2) =: s2. Let p be
a position with depth (p) ≤ d′. We show that s1(p) = s2(p). If p is a
position referring into q1/q2, the claim holds since q1 ∼d q2 and d′ ≤ d.
If p refers into m1/m2, the equality follows from Fact 3 and the fact that
d′ ≤ mdagdpthA(d′).
Now assume s1 ↓ p1 = s1 ↓ p2 for positions p1, p2 with depth (p1),
depth (p2) ≤ d′. Again, when pb is a position of sa referring into qa (or
ma), we write qa ↓ pb (or ma ↓ pb) for the term contained in qa (or ma) ad-
dressed by pb. In the case that both positions refer into q
1/q2, the claim
follows since d′ ≤ d and q1 ∼d q2.
Assume both p1 and p2 refer to a term from m
1/m2. By construction,
since p1 ∼ p2, m1DAG → p1 = m1DAG → p2. We need to show that
m2DAG ↓ p1 = m2DAG ↓ p2. Obviously, if mDAG → p1 = mDAG → p2, this
follows trivially. Hence assume this is not the case. In particular, a pre-
fix of one of these positions has been modified in the construction of mDAG
from m1DAG. Without loss of generality assume there is a prefix p of p1
such that mDAG → p contains a marker. Since in m1DAG, there is a path
from m1DAG → p to m1DAG → p1 = m1DAG → p2 , a marker was also writ-
ten into m1DAG → p2, unless there already was a prefix of p2 containing
a marker. Thus both p1 and p2 have prefixes containing markers, i.e., for




where depth (p′i) , |wi| ≤ depth (pi) ≤ d′, and mDAG → p′i contains a marker
(ri → path i). Due to Fact 2, |path i| ≤ mdagdpthA(d′). It follows that
ma ↓pi = ma ↓(p′i ◦ wi)
= (ma ↓p′i)↓wi
= (qa ↓(ri ◦ path i))↓wi
= qa ↓(ri ◦ path i ◦ wi).
Hence q1 ↓(r1◦path1◦w1) = m1 ↓p1 = m1 ↓p2 = q1 ↓(r2◦path2◦w2). Note
that depth (ri ◦ path i ◦ wi) = depth (ri)+|path i|+|wi| ≤ d′+mdagdpthA(d′)+
d′ ≤ d. From q1 ∼d q2 and the above it follows that q2 ↓ (r1 ◦ path1 ◦ w1) =
q2 ↓ (r2 ◦ path2 ◦ w2), and therefore m2 ↓ p1 = q2 ↓ (r1 ◦ path1 ◦ w1) = q2 ↓
(r2 ◦ path2 ◦ w2) = m2 ↓p2 as required.
Assume p1 refers to a term from m
1/m2, and p2 to a term from q
1/q2. Since
m1 ↓ p1 = q1 ↓ p2, and depth (p2) ≤ d′, by the construction of mDAG, there
is a prefix pr of p1 such that mDAG → pr contains a marker (r → path) for
some path path and position r with depth (r) ≤ d′, and p1 = pr ◦w for some
w with |w| ≤ depth (p1) ≤ d′. Due to Fact 2, |path| ≤ mdagdpthA(d′). Note
that
ma ↓p1 = maDAG ↓(pr ◦ w) = (maDAG ↓pr)↓w
= (qa ↓(r ◦ path))↓w = qa ↓(r ◦ path ◦ w).
It follows that q1 ↓p2 = m1 ↓p1 = q1 ↓(r◦path◦w). Since depth (p2) ≤ d′ ≤
d, and depth (r ◦ path ◦ w) = depth (r) + |path|+ |w| ≤ d′+ mdagdpthA(d′) +
d′ ≤ d, the prerequisite q1 ∼d q2 implies q2 ↓ p2 = q2 ↓ (r ◦ path ◦ w), and
hence we conclude that q2 ↓p2 = q2 ↓(r ◦ path ◦ w) = m2 ↓p1, as required.
We now show that if depth (p1), depth (p2) ≤ d′, then s2 ↓ p1 = s2 ↓ p2
implies s1 ↓ p1 = s1 ↓ p2. This is trivial if both positions refer into positions
from q1/q2.
Assume that p1 refers to a term from m
1/m2, and p2 to a term from q
1/q2.
With notation as earlier, then m2 ↓ p1 = q2 ↓ p2. We show m1 ↓ p1 = q1 ↓
p2, where we only require that depth (p1) ≤ d′, and depth (p2) ≤ 2 · d′ +
mdagdpthA(d
′) (we will use this stronger result in the sequel). Note that
no suffix of p1 can contain a newly introduced adversary nonce: Otherwise,
equality with a subterm from q2 would not hold. Assume m1 ↓ p1 6= q1 ↓ p2,
and let w be a minimal path such that m1(p1 ◦ w) 6= q1(p2 ◦ w). We first
show that there is no prefix of p1 ◦ w that refers to a marker in mDAG.
First assume there is a prefix p′ of p1 ◦ w such that p′ ◦ w′ = p1 ◦ w,
and mDAG → p′ contains the marker (r → path). From Fact 2, it follows
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that |path| ≤ mdagdpthA(d′). Since p1 and p′ have a common suffix, they
must be prefixes of each other. First assume p′ is a prefix of p1, i.e., there
is some w′′ such that p1 = p
′ ◦ w′′. Then |w′′| ≤ depth (p1) ≤ d′. It follows
that ma ↓ p1 = ma ↓ (p′ ◦ w′′) = (ma ↓ p′) ↓ w′′ = (qa ↓ (r ◦ path)) ↓ w′′ =
qa ↓ (r ◦ path ◦ w′′). In particular, q2 ↓ p2 = m2 ↓ p1 = q2 ↓ (r ◦ path ◦ w′′).
Since depth (p2) ≤ 2 · d′ + mdagdpthA(d′) ≤ d, and depth (r ◦ path ◦ w′′) =
depth (r)+|path|+|w′′| ≤ d′+mdagdpthA(d′)+d′ ≤ d, the d-equality of q1 and
q2 implies that q1 ↓ p2 = q1 ↓ (r ◦ path ◦ w′′). Hence we obtain m1(p1 ◦ w) =
(m1 ↓ p1)(w) = (q1 ↓ (r ◦ path ◦ w′′))(w) = (q1 ↓ p2)(w) = q1(p2 ◦ w), a
contradiction. Now assume p1 is a prefix of p
′, and let p′ = p1 ◦ w′′. Since p′
contains a marker, due to Fact 2, it follows that depth (d′) ≤ dagdepth(p′) ≤
mdagdpthA(d
′). We have p1◦w = p′◦w′ = p1◦w′′◦w′, and hence w = w′′◦w′.
We know that q2 ↓ (p2 ◦ w′′) = m2 ↓ (p1 ◦ w′′) = m2 ↓p′ = q2 ↓ (r ◦ path). Note
that depth (p2 ◦ w′′) = depth (p2)+|w′′| ≤ 2·d′+mdagdpthA(d′)+depth (p′) ≤
2 · d′ + 2 · mdagdpthA(d′) ≤ d, and depth (r ◦ path) = depth (r) + |path| ≤
d′ + mdagdpthA(d
′) ≤ d. Therefore the above equality and the d-equivalence
of q1 and q2 implies q1 ↓ (p2 ◦ w′′) = q1 ↓ (r ◦ path). It therefore follows that
m1 ↓ (p1 ◦ w) = m1 ↓ (p′ ◦ w′) = (m1 ↓ p′) ↓w′ = (q1 ↓ (r ◦ path)) ↓w′ = (q1 ↓
(p2 ◦ w′′))↓w′ = q1 ↓(p2 ◦ w′′ ◦ w′) = q1 ↓(p2 ◦ w), a contradiction. Therefore
there is no prefix of p1 ◦ w referring to a marker. Since there is also no
suffix of p1 referring to a new adversary nonce, it follows that m
a(p1 ◦ w) =
mDAG(p1 ◦ w). Since no prefix of p1 ◦ w contains a new adversary nonce,
we know that depth (p1 ◦ w) ≤ dagdepth(p1 ◦ w) ≤ mdagdpthA(d′) ≤ d.
It therefore follows from the d-equivalence of q1 and q2 that m1(p1 ◦ w) =
mDAG(p1 ◦ w) = m2(p1 ◦ w) = q2(p2 ◦ w) = q1(p2 ◦ w), again a contradiction.
Assume both p1 and p2 refer to a term from m
1/m2. If mDAG → p1 =
mDAG → p2, then by construction, m1 ↓ p1 = m1 ↓ p2 as required. Hence
assume this is not the case. First assume there is a prefix pr of p1 such
that pr contains a marker (r → path), i.e., p1 = pr ◦ w for some w with
|w| ≤ depth (p1) ≤ d′. Due to Fact 2, |path| ≤ mdagdpthA(d′). It follows that
ma ↓p1 = ma ↓(pr◦w) = (ma ↓pr)↓w = (qa ↓(r◦path))↓w = qa ↓(r◦path◦w),
and hence m2 ↓p2 = m2 ↓p1 = q2 ↓(r ◦ path ◦w). Since depth (r ◦ path ◦ w) =
depth (r) + |path| + |w| ≤ d′ + mdagdpthA(d′) + d′, and depth (p2) ≤ d′, the
above case (where we only required the position referring into q1/q2 to have a
depth bounded by 2 ·d′+ mdagdpthA(d′)) implies q1 ↓(r ◦path ◦w) = m1 ↓p2,
and thus m1 ↓p2 = q1 ↓(r ◦ path ◦ w) = m1 ↓p1 as required.
Hence assume no prefix of p1 or p2 leads to a position in mDAG contain-
ing a marker. Assume there is a minimal path w such that m1(p1 ◦ w) 6=
m1(p2 ◦ w). First assume that without loss of generality there is a prefix pr
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of p1 ◦w such that p1 ◦w = pr ◦w′, and mDAG → pr contains the marker (r →
path). From Fact 2, we know that dagdepth(pr), |path| ≤ mdagdpthA(d′).
Since no prefix of p1 contains a marker, and there is a common suffix of p1
and pr, pr must be a suffix of p1, i.e., there is a path w
′′ such that pr = p1◦w′′.
It thus follows that p1 ◦ w = pr ◦ w′ = p1 ◦ w′′ ◦ w′, i.e., w = w′′ ◦ w′.
Since dagdepth(pr) ≤ mdagdpthA(d′), it follows that |w′′| ≤ mdagdpthA(d′).
Obviously, we have mDAG → (p1 ◦ w) 6= mDAG → (p2 ◦ w), and there is
no prefix of p2 ◦ w such that m2 at the position of this prefix contains
a newly introduced adversary nonce (otherwise, equality of m2 ↓ (p2 ◦ w)
with a subterm of q2 would not hold). Due to construction of mDAG,
this implies that depth (p2 ◦ w) ≤ dagdepth(p2 ◦ w) ≤ mdagdpthA(d′), and
hence in particular, |w′| ≤ mdagdpthA(d′). Hence depth (r ◦ path ◦ w′) =
depth (r) + |path| + |w′| ≤ d′ + mdagdpthA(d′) + mdagdpthA(d′) ≤ d. Fact 3
implies that m1(p2 ◦ w) = m2(p2 ◦ w), and hence
m1(p2 ◦ w) = m2(p2 ◦ w) = m2(p1 ◦ w) = m2(pr ◦ w′) =
q2(r ◦ path ◦ w′) = q1(r ◦ path ◦ w′) = m1(pr ◦ w′) = m1(p1 ◦ w), a contra-
diction.
Therefore, no prefix of p1 ◦w or p2 ◦w contains a marker. Since mDAG →
(p1 ◦ w) 6= mDAG → (p2 ◦ w), if a prefix of wlog p1 ◦ w contains a newly in-
troduced adversary nonce, then m2(p1 ◦ w) 6= m2(p2 ◦ w) follows, as different
positions in m2DAG contain different new nonces—a contradiction. It there-
fore follows that m1(p1 ◦ w) = mDAG ↓ p1 ◦ w = m2(p1 ◦ w) = m2(p2 ◦ w) =
mDAG(p2 ◦ w) = m1(p2 ◦ w), a contradiction. Hence m1 ↓ p1 = m2 ↓ p2 as
claimed.
To make the construction unique, we demand that the new nonces that are
introduced are well-determined in the sense that there is an injective function
f such that in the i-th protocol step (i.e., if prvst(q1) = prvst(q2) = i − 1),
the term t is replaced with f(t, i); without loss of generality we assume that
the nonces in the image of f do not appear in the original adversary moves by
using a unique prefix for the name of the newly introduced nonces that does
not appear in the names of nonces in CPr. Note that this does not introduce
additional equalities, since different terms are replaced with different nonces,
and the introduced nonces are still fresh since f is injective.
It remains to show that there is an adversary move that results in the
message m2 being sent. For this, it is obviously sufficient to prove that for
all positions p such that mDAG → p contains a marker (r → path), and there
is no proper prefix p′ of p such that mDAG → p′ contains a marker, the term
51
q2 ↓ (r ◦ path) can be constructed by the adversary in q2. We make a case
distinction:
1. Assume that q2 ↓ (r ◦ path) is a term computed by the adversary in
the past (i.e., there is a subterm of a past adversary move that results
in this term). In this case, the term obviously can be constructed by
using the same subterm.
2. Assume that q2 ↓(r◦path) is a term that the adversary cannot compute
himself, i.e., a term not of the form mentioned in the statement of
Proposition 6.8. Since the adversary can construct q1 ↓(r ◦ path) in q1,
due to Proposition 6.8 there is an A-accessible position p′ containing
this term in q1, and due to Proposition 6.7, p′ is A-accessible in q2 as
well (the requirement for d is obviously met). Since depth (r ◦ path) ≤
d′ + mdagdpthA(d
′) ≤ d, the d-equivalence of q1 and q2 and q1 ↓ (r ◦
path) = q1 ↓p′ imply that q2 ↓(r◦path) = q2 ↓p′. Due to Proposition 6.7,
p′ is A-accessible in q2, and hence q2 ↓(r ◦ path) is constructable by the
adversary.
3. Assume that q2 ↓ (r ◦ path) is a term that the adversary can compute
himself, but that has been computed by a principal. Since terms com-
puted by principals alone (i.e., without adversary input) have depth at
most prvst(q1)·dPr, there is some path path ′ with |path ′| ≤ prvst(q1)·dPr
such that q2 ↓(r◦path ◦path ′) is of one of the above cases, and the result
follows analogously (note that for the above two cases, the requirements
for d are still met after adding prvst(q1) · dPr).
It remains to show that the adversary move resulting in the message
sequence m2 being sent can be computed from the original move m1A with
only the knowledge available to the adversary in information degree 3 in
the state q1 (obviously the result for information degree 1 and 2 follows).
Obviously, the message m1 can be computed given the state information and
the adversary move, and the above case distinction can be performed by
the adversary—the only non-trivial aspect is finding the position p′, this can
be achieved by simply comparing the subterm of m1 to subterms appearing
in A-accessible positions in q1. Note that due to the above, every marker
introduced leads to a position that is A-accessible by the adversary, hence
the computation of m2 using the markers as above can be performed with
the knowledge available to the adversary.
Finally, note that it is not necessary for the adversary to compute the
entire equivalence relation ∼: For the adversary, it is sufficient to know the
depth in which new nonces have to be introduced (this depth only depends
on the number of steps so far in the protocol run), and to know that terms
obtained from principals have to be used in the same positions. 
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For a more efficient construction, it would be desirable to replace the
function eqdeg () with one that grows more slowly in the number of steps of
the protocol. However, in the above proof, note that there does not seem
to be a straight-forward way to significantly lower the requirements on d =
eqdeg (q1) if we want to show that d
′-equivalent moves always exist. We
illustrate the reason for demanding mdagdpthA(d
′)-equivalence of the states
q1 and q2 with an example: Assume that there are a position r, positions
p1, . . . , pn, and paths w1, . . . , wn−1 such that
– depth (r) = d′,
– depth (pi) = 0 for all i,
– |wi| = d′ for all i,
– m1 ↓p1 = q1 ↓r,
– m1 ↓pi+1 = m1 ↓(pi ◦ wi).
Since all stated equalities concern positions with depth at most d′, the
same equalities must hold in m2/q2. Now note that ma ↓pn = ma ↓p1 ◦ w1 ◦
· · · ◦ wn−1 = qa ↓ r ◦ w1 · · · ◦ wn−1. Since we want that m1(pn) = m2(pn),
it follows that q1(r ◦ w1 · · · ◦ wn−1) = q2(r ◦ w1 · · · ◦ wn−1). The depth of
this position can only be restricted by showing a bound on the number of
elements in this “chain” as done in the proof above. However, a better bound
than simply the number of inequivalent positions can probably be shown: In
the situation described above, we compare positions with different depth
(since depth (pi) = 0, and depth (pi ◦ wi) = d′). The situation does not arise
when all involved positions have the maximal depth d′, which was used in
the proof to obtain the bound on the number of equivalence classes. Hence
a finer analysis will probably result in a better bound, and thus a lower
requirement for d (i.e., a slower growing function eqdeg ()). However, for
realistic protocols, the involved strategies are usually much simpler. Hence
we prefer to prove the bounds as stated in the proof, and leave the proof
itself relatively simple.
6.6 The strategy representation of a protocol
We now define CPr/≡, which as mentioned serves as a finite representation of
CPr that contains all of the latter’s strategic properties. CPr/≡ is constructed
by simply allowing the adversary to use only the moves that result in applying
the construction of Lemma 6.9:
Definition Let Pr be a protocol. Then CPr/≡ is the induced CGS obtained
from CPr by restricting the state space to the states which can be reached by
the adversary only using moves that appear as the result of the construction
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in Lemma 6.9. We call CPr/≡ the strategy representation of Pr.
Note that by construction, every term appearing in a state in CPr/≡ has
depth limited by a constant: The depth of terms which the adversary may
introduce is limited by the construction of Lemma 6.9, and the honest prin-
cipals only introduce terms of limited depth by construction. Hence CPr/≡ is
infinite, but only because of an infinite number of adversary nonces that may
be used. Since there are only finitely many positions in which the adversary
can introduce new nonces, we can without generality assume that the adver-
sary only uses finitely many nonces. Hence CPr/≡ has a finite representation:
Proposition 6.10 There is a finite CGS CPr/≡fin that is finite and there is
a probabilistic bisimulation between CPr/≡ and CPr/≡fin.
6.7 Putting it all together: Proof of Strategy Simula-
tion
We now show that ≡ induces a probabilistic uniform strong alternating sim-
ulation in both directions, i.e., from CPr to CPr/≡ and vice versa. In the
following, let Q1 and Q2 be the sets of reachable states of CPr/≡ and CPr, re-
spectively. Let Z ⊆ Q1×Q2 be the relation defined as (q1, q2) ∈ Z if and only
if q1 is the state obtained from q2 as follows: Let λ2 be the protocol run that
reaches q2. Then let λ1 be obtained from λ2 by exchanging each adversary
move by the one obtained from the construction in Lemma 6.9, and letting
the honest principals perform the same moves and randomization. Note that
by Lemmas 6.5 and 6.9, it follows that q1 ≡ q2. On the other hand, in the
following let = denote the relation where two states q1 ∈ Q1 and q2 ∈ Q2 are
identical except that the adversary nonces in q1 have the prefix introduced
by the construction in Lemma 6.9. Hence, seen as a simulation from CPr to
CPr/≡, the relation corresponds to the injection function from CPr/≡ to CPr,
which strips off these prefixes.
Theorem 6.11 The pair (Z,=) is a probabilistic bisimulation between CPr/≡
and CPr.
Proof. Obviously, Z−1◦ =−1 and =−1 ◦Z−1 are idempotent, since both con-
catenations represent projection to the representative in CPr/≡ with introduc-
tion or removal of nonce name prefixes. Hence it remains to show that each
of the relations is a probabilistic uniform strong alternating simulation. We
first treat the case =, i.e., in this case the function Z−1 from the definition of
a probabilistic uniform strong alternating simulation is not the converse of
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the relation Z introduced above, but is the injection function i : CPr/≡→ CPr
with i(q) = q, except for removal of the prefixes of adversary nonce names.
Propositional equivalence is trivial, the move properties follows using the
identity as move transfer functions (again, with consistent renaming of ad-
versary nonces), this function trivially is uniform, hence move uniformity
is satisfied. Recall that due to Proposition 6.6, principals have the same
available moves in equivalent states. Uniformity is trivial as well: Clearly,
if q2 ∼eqi(a) q
′
2, then this indistinguishability also holds for i(q2) and i(q
′
2),
as this function only permutes adversary nonces. Uniqueness is satisfied by
definition. For knowledge transfer, assume that q1, q
′
1 are states of CPr with
q1 ∼eqi(A) q
′
1, and let q2 be a state of CPr/≡ with (q1, q2) ∈=, in particular then
q2 = Z




satisfies the required properties.
Hence, consider the converse direction, in this case, Z−1 : Q2 → Q1 is
exactly the converse of the relation Z as defined above. By construction of
Z, Z−1 is a function, i.e., uniqueness holds as required. The move transfer
functions δ1→2... are those resulting from the construction of Lemma 6.9 for
the adversary, and the identity function for the honest principals. Again, this
choice is valid due to Proposition 6.6. Let (q1, q2) ∈ Z, i.e., let q1 = Z−1(q2).
Propositional Equivalence This is trivial, as the propositional variables
only depend on the local states of the principals, and these are the
same in ≡-equivalent states.
Move Uniformity For honest principals this is trivial, as the move transfer
function is simply the identity. For the adversary the claim follows from
Lemma 6.9.
Uniqueness Follows from the construction of Z: There is exactly one state
q1 such that (q1, q2) ∈ Z for every reachable state q2.
Move Transfer This directly follows from Lemmas 6.5 and 6.9: Apply-
ing the move resulting from these constructions directly results in
≡-equivalent states. For the honest principals, instantiate d1 with
eqdeg (q1), d2 and d3 with dPr. Note that the move of the adversary
and the principals are performed in parallel and therefore one cannot
use terms obtained as the result of the other. By construction, the
same local states of honest principals are reached with the same proba-
bility, and the terms in the resulting states are equivalent to the degree
required in the successor states of q1 and q2 due to the mentioned Lem-
mas.
Uniformity Let q2 and q
′
2 be states such that for some player a ∈
{1, . . . , k,A}, we have that q2 ∼eqi(a) q
′
2. Then this indistinguisha-
bility also holds for Z−1(q2) and Z
−1(q′2), since by construction these
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are obtained from q2 and q
′
2 by consistent replacement of terms with
adversary nonces.
Knowledge Transfer Let q′1 ∼eqi(A) q1 for q1, q2 ∈ Q1. Let q
′
2 be the state
obtained from q′1 by replacing the adversary nonces introduced by the
construction from Lemma 6.9 with the original terms (since unique
nonces were introduced for each term, this construction is well-defined).
Obviously, q′2 ≡ q′1, and q′2 ∼eqi(A) q2, since the same terms correspond
to the same nonces in the translation Z−1(q2) and Z
−1(q′2).

Decidability now follows, since using transitivity, we know that there
is a probabilistic bisimulation between CPr and CPr/≡fin, and the latter by
definition is a finite CGS. Also, from the construction it is obvious that CPr/≡fin
can be computed on input Pr: Since the length of every term appearing in
CPr/≡fin is bounded by a constant, the set of possible adversary moves can be
determined by brute-force, applying all possible terms to construct messages
up to this bound. Further, the initial states of CPr and CPr/≡fin are identical;
hence Theorem 6.2 and thus Theorem 4.1 are proven, since decidability in
the finite model CPr/≡fin follows from the results in [Sch10a].
6.8 Decidability for Extension of the Protocol Model
The decision procedure for the extended protocol model suggested in Sec-
tion 4 proceeds as follows: We add, for every test in the formula, an ad-
ditional principal to the protocol system that performs this test as part of
its protocol role (and modify existing principals to forward the necessary
messages to the newly introduced test principal). The effect of this addition
is that the construction used for the proof of the standard model ensures
that the results of the tests are invariant under bisimulation, this follows
directly from Proposition 6.6. Note that in this case, the structure CPr/≡fin
does not only depend on the protocol Pr, but also on the formula that is to
be evaluated. Also note that the condition that every principal only uses the
secret keys and nonces of a single identity is not necessary for the decidability
result, but is only required to obtain realistically executable programs.
It is clear that the addition about dynamically available channels does
not pose a problem for the decidability procedure, since timing information
is invariant under the bisimulation used in the main proof. This holds more
generally for every situation in which the set of available channels is a function
of the current protocol states of the principals.
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7 Conclusion and Future Research
We introduced a decidable model that treats epistemic and strategic proper-
ties of probabilistic cryptographic protocols. Interesting open questions are
a complexity analysis of the decision problem, and whether security in our
model transfers to a computational setting.
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